Britain's ‘betrayal’ of Hong Kong: A second look

Claims of British bungling and betrayal were repeatedly raised during the prolonged run‐up to the 1997 Hong Kong handover. This paper seeks to evaluate such claims. It examines five controversial episodes of reputed British mishandling of the Hong Kong transition: (1) Governor Murray MacLehose's reputed double faux pas of March 1979, when the governor first putatively erred by prematurely (and unnecessarily) raising the ‘1997 question’ in a routine meeting with Deng Xiaoping and then compounded his error by misrepresenting Deng's less‐than‐reassuring response; (2) Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's 1982 miscalculation in requesting a 50‐year extension of the New Territories lease when it was already abundantly clear that Chinese leaders regarded the original lease as ‘unequal'—and therefore non‐binding; (3) Britain's 1987 decision to unilaterally postpone Hong Kong's first direct legislative elections, a decision defended on the disingenuous grounds that government surveys had revealed a majority of the Hong Kong public to be opposed to rapid democratization; (4) Britain's ostensible failure, in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen debacle, to secure the inclusion of adequate democratic safeguards in the final draft of the Hong Kong Basic Law, completed early in 1990; and (5) Governor Chris Patten's ill‐starred democratic reform initiatives of 1992–95, which sharply reversed Britain's previous ‘convergence’ policy and ultimately led to the derailing of Hong Kong's vaunted ‘through train’. Examining available evidence on these five episodes (and one or two other, related cases), this paper argues that despite occasional, palpable policy miscalculations and a notable lack of official candor, Britain did not do serious harm to the vital interests of Hong Kong. On the contrary, the paper argues, given the substantial advantage in resources and leverage enjoyed by the Chinese side throughout the transition period, a more favorable outcome could hardly have been achieved. The one residual allegation of British betrayal that cannot readily be countered, however, is the charge that racism within Britain's ruling Conservative Party—manifested in Parliamentary legislation severely restricting the flow of immigrants from British colonial territories—played a significant role in the British Government's choice of tactics in dealing with the ‘1997 question’.     

Intergovernmental cooperation,regulatory agencies and transportation regulation in Canada: the case of Part III of the National Transportation Act

In the National Transportation Act of 1967, provision was made, by means of Part III of the legislation, for the federal government to regulate directly the extra-provincial motor carrier industry. This section has never been implemented and this article attempts to explain why. Such an explanation, it is argued, is important because of the philosophy of the NTA, the responsibilities given to the Canadian Transport Commission and the inadequacies of the existing provincial regulatory systems. The explanation is to be found in an analysis of two factors whose interrelationship has been given inadequate attention. The first factor is the growing recognition of the need for intergovernmental collaboration in transportation planning and regulation. The second is the role of regulatory bodies in the policy process. The argument is advanced that the conflict over implementation of Part in illustrates a number of problems with respect to the appropriate functions of regulatory agencies, particularly in the context of intergovernmental negotiations. The article concludes with the suggestion for a possible course of action that may be applicable to other policy areas. Sommaire. La partie III de la Loi nationale sur les transports de 1967 prévoyait la régulation directe par le gouvernement fédéral de l'industrie du transport extre-provincial par véhicule moteur. Ces dispositions n'ont jamais été mises en application et le présent article tente d'en expliquer les raisons. Une explication s'impose, en effet, en raison de la philosophie même de la loi, des responsabilités qui incombent à la Commission canadienne des transports et des faiblesses de la règlementation provinciale actuelle. L'auteur attribue cette situation à deux facteurs dont l'interdépendance a été sous-estimée. Le premier est celui de la reconnaissance accrue de la nécessité d'une collaboration intergouvernementale pour la planification et la régulation des transports. Le second est le rôle des organismes de regulation dans l'élaboration de la politique en la matière. On suggère que le conflit touchant la mise en application de la Partie in de la loi fait ressorti un certain nombre de problèmes relatifs à la détermination des functions propres des organismes de régulation, particulièrement dans le contexte des négociations intergou-vemnementales. L'article propose en conclusion une ligne de conduite qui pourrait convenir à d'autres secteurs.