Unemployment and crime: the role of apprehension

An increase in the unemployment rate decreases the opportunity cost of crime and increases the crime rate according to standard microeconomics models. However, a large body of empirical research has shown that an increase in unemployment may increase or decrease crime. By incorporating the return to crime into standard economic models, this paper shows that an increase in unemployment, as in recessions, decreases the opportunity cost of crime and the return to crime as well. As a result, the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and depends on the apprehension rate. An increase in the unemployment rate tends to decrease the crime rate at lower apprehension rates, but to increase it at higher apprehension rates. An increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits does not necessarily reduce the crime rate, and the effect of more generous unemployment insurance on crime depends again on the apprehension rate.     

SECRETARY OF STATE MARSHALL,GENERAL CLAY,AND THE MOSCOW COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING OF 1947: A RESPONSE TO PHILIP ZELIKOW

This commentary challenges the major conclusion of a 1997 article which appeared in this journal. There, Philip Zelikow argued that previous treatments of the Council of Foreign Ministers 1947 meeting in Moscow erred in their characterization of the role of US Secretary of State Marshall. Earlier studies, in Zelikow’s view, failed to understand that Marshall, refusing to be constrained by the recently announced containment policy, made a serious effort to meet Soviet demands for reparations from current German output. It is contended here that a review of the evidence, especially materials from the John Foster Dulles papers and from British archives, does not support Zelikow’s conclusion.