Maquiladora Mortality: Manufacturing Plant Closure in Mexico

Manufacturing plant closure has been the subject of much national concern, and an extensive literature principally focused on the developed world. This study extends the findings on plant closure with an analysis of export-oriented manufacturers (maquiladoras) in Mexico, 1996–2006. The foci of this research are hypothesised variables of maquiladora closure: product manufactured (value-added), size of plant, plant location, and size of urban place. The results of a logistical regression model indicate that plant size and value-added are highly probable determinants of plant closure; large, high value-added product maquiladoras have low rates of plant closure. Maquiladoras manufacturing low value-added products have high rates of closure; however, these manufacturers also have significant numbers of surviving plants. This suggests that multiple manufacturing platforms are viable among Mexico’s export-oriented industry. The findings also suggest that much plant closure is a result of exogenous factors,exiting plants in a global search for cheap labour. Mexico, however, has a geographic comparative advantage that, for many maquiladoras, trumps wages in more distant locations.     

Aufklärung und Abwehr: The lasting legacy of the Stasi under Ernst Wollweber

The following article traces the development of East Germany's secret police, the Stasi, during the reign of Ernst Wollweber, the second Minister of State Security. By examining key Stasi operations during this period, notably the ‘concentrated strikes’ strategy following the June 1953 revolution, the campaign against Ostbüros, and operations to secure the economy, and by examining Wollweber's major speeches, it argues that Wollweber's reign was a decisive one for the Stasi because of the integration of intelligence gathering outside of East Germany (Aufklärung) with domestic surveillance (Abwehr). Although this balance shifted toward external duties in Wollweber's landmark August 1955 speech, Wollweber continued to promote integration of the two duties, in particular by anchoring the intelligence gathering duties in the local-level domestic structures of the Stasi.     

On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions

In the winter 1978 issue of International Security, Raymond L. Garthoff authored a seminal article outlining common fallacies in United States government estimates of enemy intentions during the Cold War. Now, given the significant changes in threat over the past 30 years, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look at fallacies – evaluating old ones and introducing new ones – in enemy intentions estimates pertaining to post-Cold War (and post-9/11) security dangers. Based on its assessment, this article concludes that the challenges to accurate intelligence assessment of enemy intentions, and the need to move away from dysfunctional standard operating procedures, have never been higher.     

The business of a secret war: Operation ‘Remorse’ and SOE salesmanship in Wartime China

The prime British objective in China during the Pacific War was the re-establishment of pre-war trade and influence and the recovery of Hong Kong. Through Operation ‘Remorse’ (1944–45) the Special Operations Executive covertly established a wide network of distributors and buyers throughout occupied and unoccupied China for high-value low-bulk goods and currencies, using the returns acccruing to buy influence, information, safety and food for Allied prisoners, subsidise politically problematic operations, and smooth the British path back into Hong Kong. ‘Remorse’ epitomised the concerns and demonstrated the methods of the British presence in China generally: a readiness to innovate and adapt, market sensitivity and a capacity for making unlikely local alliances, all held together through a strong focus on a fixed target – a secure China base for Sino-British trade.     

Does Familiarity Breed Contempt? The Impact of Information on Mass Attitudes toward Congress

Two features of citizen response to Congress can be taken as grounds for concern. First, Americans know relatively little about Congress, and especially about congressional procedures and policy output. Second, Congress typically emerges as the least respected political institution. Although these matters are troubling when viewed individually, more disturbing is the dilemma posed when knowledge and attitudes toward Congress are viewed in tandem. It appears that citizens who know Congress the best like Congress the least. Consequently, a sophisticated polity and a well-respected legislature seem fundamentally incompatible. This article seeks to resolve this dilemma, contending that there is nothing about knowledge per se that leads citizens to view Congress unfavorably. Rather, differences in knowledge levels alter the considerations citizens bring to bear when evaluating Congress, with the best-informed individuals constructing judgments on the basis of the most relevant Congress-specific criteria while less knowledgeable citizens employ readily available but more peripheral criteria.