When every relationship is above average

Marriage license applicants and law students were surveyed about their knowledge of divorce statutes, knowledge of the demographics of divorce, and expectations for their own marriage. Both groups had largely incorrect perceptions of the legal terms of the marriage contract as embodied in divorce statutes, but they had relatively accurate, if sometimes optimistic, perceptions of both the likelihood and the effects of divorce in the population at large. These same individuals expressed thoroughly idealistic expectations about both the longevity of their own marriages and the consequences should they personally be divorced. Increasing individuals' knowledge of divorce statutes through a course on family law did not diminish this unrealistic optimism. Both groups largely approved of the existing divorce statutes, although there was substantial agreement about a few important respects in which the laws should be changed. These findings suggest that the sense of unfairness and surprise that frequently attend divorce may be a result of systematic cognitive biases rather than of a lack of information about divorce.     

State Courts, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Protection of Civil Liberties

Advocates of federalism, both in the United States and elsewhere, often cite the potential for enhanced protection of individual civil liberties as an emerging rationale for a federal system dividing governmental responsibilities between central and regional governments and central and regional judiciaries. Echoing this, some judicial officials and scholars, confronting an increasingly conservative U.S. Supreme Court, have called for state supreme courts to use the state constitutional grounds to preserve and increase the protections of the Bill of Rights. Using event count analysis, we examine state search-and-seizure cases for 1981 to 1993 to ascertain under what circumstances state courts would use this opportunity to eliminate Supreme Court review. We find that the relative ideological position of the state supreme courts and the U.S. Supreme Court often prevents, or does away with the need for, liberal courts to use the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine to expand the rights of criminal defendants and that state supreme court justices react more predictably in the assertion of constitutional protection law than the general consensus suggests.     

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN ENERGY POLICY

Pietro S. Nivola. The Politics of Energy Conservation
John C. Sawhill and Richard Cotton (Eds.), Energy Conservation: Successes and Failures
Richard H. K. Victor, Energy Policy in America Since 1945: A Study of Business-Government Relations     

The Nature of Legal Philosophy

Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content.