Workplace justice and employee worth

Distributive and procedural justice gain new meaning in light of other distinctions about how organizations value employees (the employees' “worth”). Fair compensation gives employees worth as achieved status: how the employee is like some employees (similarly rewarded) and not like others (dissimilarly rewarded). But employees also want to be treated uniquely as individuals and in other ways to be treated like all other employees, both reflecting worth as ascribed status. Such worth need not involve the distribution of outcomes; it can be gained if procedures function as ends in themselves. Different types of worth thus become the source of different criteria for justice. Based on a paper entitled “Justice as Worth,” which was prepared for the Third International Conference on Social Justice research (held in the Netherlands during July 1991).     

Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry

Cross-national case studies have indicated that compared to other economically advanced democracies, American methods of policy implementation and dispute resolution are more adversarial and legalistic, shaped by costly court action or the prospect of it. To what extent are lawyers responsible for creating American-style adversarial legalism? This article argues that while adversarial legalism stems primarily from enduring features of American political culture and governmental structure, the legal profession plays a significant independent role in promoting and perpetuating this mode of governance.     

Americans and their sexual partners

Andrew M. Greeley is a priest, sociologist, novelist, and journalist. His scholarly writings concentrate on religion and ethnicity. His other writings range from critiques of the Catholic church to best-selling novels.     

Veto Players and Civil War Duration

Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This article argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.