Risky Drinking and Driving/Riding Decisions: The Role of Previous Experience

Factors related to risky drinking and driving/riding decisions were explored by presenting vignettes to 135 older adolescents, 17–24 years of age, with vignettes related to drinking and other social behaviors engaged in at a party. Analyses revealed that alcohol-related behaviors, attitudes toward the acceptability of drinking and driving, and previous drinking and driving/riding experiences were all significant predictors of decisions about driving or riding while intoxicated. Indeed, the overall model accounted for 46% of risky drinking and driving/riding decisions. As predicted, older respondents had more previous experiences with driving while intoxicated and riding with intoxicated drivers than did younger respondents, and they reported that drinking and driving was more acceptable among their peers. However, contrary to expectations, there were no differences in the number of risky decisions made by the two age groups or between males and females. The importance of previous experiences is discussed.     

Moving from national to international environmental policy

Environmental problems will increasingly spill over national boundaries. An effective and efficient response to these problems will require international solutions; relying purely on national regulatory mechanisms to address global issues will not suffice. To meet this need, better international environmental programs must be developed that maximize collective gain, enforce property rights, address the range of environmental values present in different countries, and fairly determine who should pay for global-scale pollution control.     

The Changing Property Tax and State-Local Relations

The substantial transfer of fiscal power to state government,undermining local government autonomy, characterizes the courseof state-local relations in the last quarter of the twentiethcentury in the United States. Central to this shift is diminishedlocal control of the property tax, a result of the tax limitationsadopted in most states since the 1970s. This article arguesthat control of the property tax is critical to the workingsof local representative democracy, affecting both the discretionof elected officials and participation of citizens. It presentsboth quantitative and qualitative evidence of the centralizationtrend, including changes in property-tax flows and state financesaffecting local governments, an analysis of the comparativeseverity of property-tax limitations, changes in K-12 educationfinancing, and local consequences of the tax limitations.     

Vers un nouvel État–providence: I'expérience de la Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec

Sommaire: Depuis prés de vingt ans, il est question de la crise de I'état–providence. Mais à quoi ressemblera l'état–postprovidence? Parce que l'intervention de 1'état en matière de gestion des risques professionnels a souvent constitué l'acte de naissance de I état–providence au sein des pays de I'ocde, nous avons choisi d'observer les développements récents dans le domaine de la gestion des risques professionnels au Québec. Après avoir COMU une grave crise financière en 1991, la Commission de la santé et de la séurité du travail du Québec s'est livrée à une réingénierie des proces–sus de travail en matiére de réparation des lésions professionnelles. En extraolant a partir du « modèle csst», on constate que le mode d'intervention de 1'état se caractérise désormais par la recherche de 1'équité dans l'attribution des ressources, davantage que par la recherche de 1'égalité. Toutefois, on observe également que pour effectuer la gestion de I'équité, il faut favoriser la participation des « clients»à Yadministration de la fonction publique. Abstract: For almost twenty years now, the welfare state has been said to be in crisis. But what will the post–welfare state look like? Because government intervention in the management of professional risk was often the trigger for the emergence of the welfare state within the oecd countries, we chose to analyse recent developments in the management of professional risk in Quebec. Following a severe financial crisis in 1991, the Quebec Health and Work Safety Board re–engineered the work processes concerning the repair of job injuries. Extrapolating from the “csst [Commission de la santé et de la séurité du travail] model,” it is clear that government intervention is now characterized by a search for equity in resource allocation rather than a search for equality. However, it is also noted that, in order to manage equity, “client” participation in the administration of the public service must also be promoted. À la fin du XIX^e siècle, l'état modeme, l'état de droit, se présente sous une nouvelle forme: l'état–providence. Au cours du siècle suivant, l'étatDésormais, c'est l'appartenance anonyme à cette com–munauté‘devenue société’ qui est garante de la sécurité de l'individu     

Multiparty electoral competition in the Netherlands and Germany: A model based on multinomial probit

A typical assumption of electoral models of party competition is that parties adopt policy positions so as to maximize expected vote share. Here we use Euro-barometer survey data and European elite-study data from 1979 for the Netherlands and Germany to construct a stochastic model of voter response, based on multinomial probit estimation. For each of these countries, we estimate a pure spatial electoral voting model and a joint spatial model. The latter model also includes individual voter and demographic characteristics. The pure spatial models for the two countries quite accurately described the electoral response as a stochastic function of party positions. We use these models to perform a thought experiment so as to estimate the expected vote maximizing party positions. We go on to propose a model of internal party decision-making based both on pre-election electoral estimation and post-election coalition bargaining. This model suggests why the various parties in the period in question did not adopt vote maximizing positions. We argue that maximizing expected vote will not, in general, be a rational party strategy in multiparty political systems which are based on proportional representation.