The impact of European economic integration on business associations: The UK case

This article presents the results of new survey research that assesses the routes and activities used by UK business associations in gathering and exchanging information with European institutions. All major UK business associations are covered, ranging from trade and professional associations to associations of the self‐employed and federations. A representative sampling framework allows general conclusions for the whole association sector to be drawn. The chief findings are that there are multiple routes for European activities employed by most associations. The most important route for all categories (except federations) is the national route, using meetings with UK ministers, officials or agencies as an attempt to get them to influence the EU. The second most important route is through European associations (which is the chief route for federations), which are also seen as the most open to influence. A ‘Brussels strategy’ of direct lobbying, or a Brussels office, is the third most important route. It is the main route for 16 per cent of respondents, which is surprising given its costs but demonstrates the increasingly important light in which the European institutions are seen. The use by associations of individual member companies to lobby for them is also surprisingly high (for 10 per cent it is the main route). Association size, resources and sectoral circumstances are shown to be important influences on an association's European strategy.     

The business of a secret war: Operation ‘Remorse’ and SOE salesmanship in Wartime China

The prime British objective in China during the Pacific War was the re-establishment of pre-war trade and influence and the recovery of Hong Kong. Through Operation ‘Remorse’ (1944–45) the Special Operations Executive covertly established a wide network of distributors and buyers throughout occupied and unoccupied China for high-value low-bulk goods and currencies, using the returns acccruing to buy influence, information, safety and food for Allied prisoners, subsidise politically problematic operations, and smooth the British path back into Hong Kong. ‘Remorse’ epitomised the concerns and demonstrated the methods of the British presence in China generally: a readiness to innovate and adapt, market sensitivity and a capacity for making unlikely local alliances, all held together through a strong focus on a fixed target – a secure China base for Sino-British trade.     

On Estimating Post-Cold War Enemy Intentions

In the winter 1978 issue of International Security, Raymond L. Garthoff authored a seminal article outlining common fallacies in United States government estimates of enemy intentions during the Cold War. Now, given the significant changes in threat over the past 30 years, it seems appropriate to take a fresh look at fallacies – evaluating old ones and introducing new ones – in enemy intentions estimates pertaining to post-Cold War (and post-9/11) security dangers. Based on its assessment, this article concludes that the challenges to accurate intelligence assessment of enemy intentions, and the need to move away from dysfunctional standard operating procedures, have never been higher.