Rethinking Timing of First Sex and Delinquency

The relation between timing of first sex and later delinquency was examined using a genetically informed sample of 534 same-sex twin pairs from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, who were assessed at three time points over a 7-year interval. Genetic and environmental differences between families were found to account for the association between earlier age at first sex and increases in delinquency. After controlling for these genetic and environmental confounds using a quasi-experimental design, earlier age at first sex predicted lower levels of delinquency in early adulthood. The current study is contrasted with previous research with non-genetically informative samples, including Armour and Haynie (2007, Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 36, 141–152). Results suggest a more nuanced perspective on the meaning and consequences of adolescent sexuality than is commonly put forth in the literature.

Cosmopolitan Democracy and the EU: The Case of Gender

Cosmopolitan democracy is one of the most debated models of transnational democracy. As a result of his prominence in this field, David Held has attracted much of the criticism and approval of this position. The critique and comment aimed at cosmopolitanism in general, and Held's work in particular, has provoked cosmopolitan advocates to respond, restate and develop their arguments. However, despite its considerable merit, this debate remains largely theoretical, and little has been done in terms of studying the realisation of cosmopolitanism in real-world settings. This article contributes towards the debate concerning the possibility of its actual application by mapping the principles of cosmopolitan democracy in relation to the EU polity and the issue of gender equality. It argues that the EU articulates certain cosmopolitan-comparable principles, and by studying areas where they are clearly exhibited, such as the issue of gender, that this helps us to critically evaluate their practicability and enables a response to criticisms levelled at cosmopolitan democracy. This article addresses two specific criticisms. Firstly, in view of the justiciable qualities of EU law, and its ability to give rise to formal individual rights, it is argued that claims regarding the inherently fictitious nature of cosmopolitan rights are unfounded. Secondly, while acknowledging that civic engagement takes a principally legal mode in relation to the issue of gender, this article rejects the claim that cosmopolitan democracy neglects the political aspects of citizenship. However, cosmopolitan scholars must extend their understanding of the relation between rights and the wider aspects of citizenship engagement, if they hope to realise the vision of an active citizenry that remains central to the cosmopolitan project.     

Surprise party

Alesina’s (Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 651–678, 1987) influential model of presidential elections with ideologically motivated parties attributes higher growth and lower unemployment under Democratic presidents to the surprise inflation a Democratic victory entails. In contrast to the published literature, we test this hypothesis using calculations of presidential election surprises consistent with the assumption of rational economic actors. We confront the econometric complications attending a time-series approach taking into account economic growth dynamics. We ultimately fail to confirm the hypothesis that the level of uncertainty associated with presidential election results has an effect on economic outcomes.     

Voting on slavery at the Constitutional Convention

This paper provides the first empirical study of delegate voting behavior on issues of slavery at the U.S. Constitutional Convention. We analyze two categories of votes: those related to apportionment and those related to the regulation of the slave trade. Although it is widely believed that delegates voted consistent with the interests of their states on issues of slavery, we find that for votes on apportionment, the effect of state interests was enhanced by both the delegate’s personal interest and his religious background. For votes regulating the slave trade, state interests had a significant effect but only within specific regions.