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Christopher J. O'Leary Robert G. Spiegelman Kenneth J. Kline 《Journal of policy analysis and management》1995,14(2):245-269
Unemployment insurance is intended to reduce hardship by providing labor force members with partial wage replacement during periods of involuntary unemployment. However, in performing this income maintenance function, unemployment insurance may prolong spells of unemployment. Evidence from a field experiment conducted in Illinois in 1984 suggested that offering unemployment insurance claimants a modest cash bonus for rapid reemployment would increase the speed of return to work and reduce program costs. In 1988 a similar experiment, examining several different bonus offers, was conducted in the state of Washington. Evidence from the Washington experiment indicates that bonus offers do change job seeking behavior, but that only relatively generous bonus offers—about six times the weekly benefit amount—should be expected to significantly change the behavior of people eligible for unemployment benefits. 相似文献
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The recent Supreme Court decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services giving more discretion to states to regulate abortion has led to speculation concerning which states might move to limit abortions. Medoff (1989) attempts to predict how state legislatures might vote on state-level abortion legislation by examining the 1983 Senate vote on the Hatch/Eagleton Amendment. We expand upon Medoff's analysis by incor- porating recent developments in agency theory as it applies to the political agents (i.e., Senators) in the empirical model. The results demonstrate that accounting for Senatorial "shirking" and state ideology substantially im- proves the predictive ability of the model for the Senate abortion vote. The predicted votes of the state's Senators, after eliminating the effects of apparent Senatorial shirking, are used to infer the likelihood of state-level legislation substantially restricting abortion. We compare these results to a base model that ignores the issue of shirking and find increased predict- ability and several differing results. 相似文献
216.
Robert W. Hahn 《Public Choice》1990,65(1):21-47
There are several theories that attempt to explain various aspects of environmental policy. Building on insights from this theoretical work, and recent advances in our understanding of instrument performance, this paper constructs a more complete theory of environmental regulation. There are two primary contributions of this research. The first is to provide more satisfactory explanations for a number of observed patterns of environmental policy. For example, there is, as yet, no satisfactory theory about the emergence of incentive-based mechanisms, such as marketable permits and effluent fees. The second contribution of this paper is to develop a parsimonious framework for understanding many important aspects of environmental policy. This framework suggests the outputs of environmental policy emerge from a struggle between key interest groups.This research was supported by the National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Gordon Hester for helpful comments. Responsibility for the final product rests solely with the author. 相似文献
217.
In principle, reporting by state and local governments to thefederal government is essential to the design and implementationof national policy. In practice, reporting often engenders resentmentof federal intrusion and is often dismissed as a waste of stateand local resources. Is reporting useless? Does it strengthenthe federal government at the expense of state and local governments?We asked federal, state, local, and site officials about thevalue and burden of five specific reporting systems in elementaryand secondary education. Common assumptions about reportingdid not correspond to respondent reactions. Both value and burdencascade through the intergovernmental system, reaching policymakersin all governments. Although critics seldom discriminate betweentypes of reporting, we found that reporting designed to improvecompliance with federal standards evoked different judgmentsof value and burden than reporting designed for assistance.These results suggest some new approaches to federal policygoverning the collection of information and to the design ofindividual reporting systems. 相似文献
218.
Robert P. Stoker 《政策研究评论》1989,9(1):29-49
The diffusion of authority characteristic of federal governance challenges national leadership and complicates even the implementation of policy that promises mutual gains. To explore the problems of implementing national policy in a federalist context, this paper proposes a new approach to analysis, t h e implementation regime framework. From the regime perspective, the essential task of the implementation process is to create a context in which implementors are likely to cooperate to achieve policy goals despite the absence of dominating authority. Drawing upon the literature on international cooperation, the regime framework outlines the contextual conditions and elements of policy design that are likely to lead to cooperation in collective decision making. 相似文献
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This paper analyzes principal-agent slack in the context of a political market composed of voters, challengers, and incumbents. The introduction of a last period (via finite-livedness) in combination with voters' imperfect information about politicians' preferences causes time-varying shirking behavior on the part of politicians. Political markets eventually sort out those politicians with significantly deviant policy preferences, potentially providing a solution to the last period problem and enabling politicians to make credible commitments. In the extreme, sorting can insure that it is not worthwhile for potential shirkers to run for office. A systematic relationship between political shirking and number of terms in office may exist, and depends on how quickly sorting takes place. We show that evidence of little if any shirking is quite consistent with politicians having diverse and strongly held policy preferences. In addition, if sorting is a significant feature of political markets, cross-sectional studies will tend to oversample little- and non-shirking politicians compared to longitudinal studies. Reinterpretations of existing empirical work are also discussed.We wish to thank John Bond, Donald Deere, Gertrud Fremling, Tim Gronberg, Michael Munger, Russell Roberts, and the participants of workshops at Dartmouth College, Texas A&M University, University of Houston, University of Texas, Yale Law School, and the 1987 Public Choice Meetings for valuable discussions on earlier drafts of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was issued as working paper E-87-34 by the Hoover Institution. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Sentencing Commission nor those of any of its Commissioners. Any remaining errors are of course our own. 相似文献
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