The increasing labor force participation of older workers and its effect on the income of the aged

The labor force participation rates of men and women aged 62-79 have notably increased since the mid-1990s. The result is a dramatic increase in the share of total money income attributable to earnings. For persons aged 65-69, the earnings share of total income increased from 28 percent in 1980 to 42 percent in 2009. For this age group in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Social Security benefits and earnings were roughly equal shares of total money income (about 30 percent); the earnings share is now more than 12 percentage points larger. When we focus on aged persons who receive Social Security benefits, earnings shares have increased markedly throughout the 62-79 age range since the early 1990s. We show that for aged persons with labor market earnings, those earnings have a large effect on their relative position in the distribution of annual money income of older Americans.     

Regulators and Redskins

We examine the correlation between federal government activity and performance of the capital’s National Football League team, the Washington Redskins. We find a positive, non-spurious, and robust correlation between the Redskins’ winning percentage and bureaucratic output, measured by pages published in the Federal Register. Because the Redskins’ performance is prototypically exogenous, we give this result a causal interpretation and provide a plausible, causal mechanism: bureaucrats must make “logrolling” deals to expand their regulatory power, and a winning football team offers a shared source of optimism to lubricate such negotiations. We do not find the same correlation when examining congressional activity.     

Persistent Fighting and Shifting Power

Three striking features about both interstate and civil war are (1) there are often periods of persistent fighting, (2) fighting commonly ends in negotiated settlements as well as in militarily decisive outcomes, and (3) fighting sometimes recurs. This article links these features to shifts in the distribution of power and to the fact that one of the functions of fighting is to forestall adverse shifts. The analysis centers on a simple model of state consolidation. The equilibrium displays these features: Fighting occurs when the distribution of power is shifting rapidly. The factions avoid fighting and cut deals when the distribution of power shifts slowly or is stable. Fighting resumes if the distribution of power again begins to shift rapidly. The analysis also shows that state consolidation can occur without fighting if the process is sufficiently slow. Fighting now rather than later can also reduce the total cost of fighting.     

Can Nonexperimental Estimates Replicate Estimates Based on Random Assignment in Evaluations of School Choice? A Within‐Study Comparison

The ability of nonexperimental estimators to match impact estimates derived from random assignment is examined using data from the evaluation of two interdistrict magnet schools. As in previous within‐study comparisons, nonexperimental estimates differ from estimates based on random assignment when nonexperimental estimators are implemented without pretreatment measures of academic performance. With comparison groups consisting of students drawn from the same districts or districts with similar student body characteristics as the districts where treatment group students reside, using pretreatment test scores reduces the bias in nonexperimental methods between 64 and 96 percent. Adding pretreatment test scores does not achieve as much bias reduction when the comparison group consists of students drawn from districts with different student body characteristics than the treatment group students’ districts. The results suggest that using pretreatment outcome measures and comparison groups that are geographically aligned with the treatment group greatly improves the performance of nonexperimental estimators.     

Debt and Deception: How States Avoid Making Hard Fiscal Decisions

Government borrowing occurs whenever the government forgoes control over some future flow of resources or benefits in order to acquire resources for current use. Based on this definition, the authors identify several ways that state governments borrow, which include widely recognized forms of debt as well as types of actions that are less transparent. Case studies for Connecticut, Illinois, and New York document the large amounts of future commitments that these states have taken on to cover operating deficits over the last decade. The authors conclude by evaluating the usefulness of current financial statements for assessing the amount of borrowing that states have done to support current services and suggest areas for which additional information is needed.     

Voter sincerity and the time-of-voting-decision

This article explores the relationship between vote sincerity and the time at which vote decisions are finalized. It posits that a specific set of competitive circumstances are necessary for insincere voting to occur, and that voters' understanding of these circumstances can be influenced by exposure to information during a campaign. The article introduces a new method of operationalizing a commonly overlooked type of insincere voting: the protest voter. As defined here, protest voters express their political dissatisfaction by supporting an uncompetitive non-traditional party that is not their first preference. Canadian Election Study data reveal that protest voters make up a small, but noteworthy segment of the electorate and that insincere voters tend to make their vote decisions relatively late.     

Economic voting in Britain, 1857–1914

Despite limited government control over the pre-1914 economy, opposition politicians were enthusiastic in blaming bad economic news on the incumbent. In a study of 458 by-elections between 1857 and 1914, we find that voters typically gave new governments a 'honeymoon' but thereafter held them responsible for high unemployment and high prices. Each 1% rise in the price level, on average, brought about a 0.21% swing against the government of the day, while each one-point rise in the percentage unemployed had double this effect. However, when we split the electorate into borough and county constituencies, economic voting appears to be confined to the former.