Banking in a theory of the business cycle: a model and critique of the Basle Accord on risk-based capital requirements for banks

This paper presents a theoretical framework for understanding the investment decisions and financing decisions of financial and non-financial enterprises over the business cycle. At the core of this theoretical framework is an agency problem between relatively more risk averse depositor/bondholders and relatively less risk averse stockholders. The solution to this agency problem is a corporate governance system that takes the form of an up-front contract that directs managers to make portfolio/investment decisions in the interest of their stockholders, and financing decisions in the interest of their depositor/bondholders. This enables depositor/bondholders to offset any risk shifting portfolio/investment decisions made on behalf of the shareholders thereby mitigating the moral hazard problem among debtors and creditors. The Basle Accord on risk-based capital requirements for depository institutions is one particular regulatory application of this more general theoretical framework. The paper concludes with a comparison between the Basle Accord and the 100% reserve or narrow banking proposal as the means of achieving a risk-free medium of exchange and a financial system that facilitates the optimal transfer of resources from savers to investors consistent with society’s aversion towards risk.     

Differentiation of hydrocephalic calf and human calvariae

Occasionally, partial calvariae of hydrocephalic calves are found in forensic contexts and mistakenly identified as human. Such specimens can be properly identified through immunological assessment of associated soft tissue, microscopic analysis of associated hair, and morphological comparison with documented museum specimens. Morphological comparison should focus on the form of the occiput, supraorbital grooves, and bulbous vault and presence of coronal processes.     

Methodology for the analysis of civil commitment detention times and costs

The authors expand their methodology for quantifying and comparing civil commitment processes by developing new formulas for the determination of the average commitment detention time and cost. They also examine the effects of specific changes in commitment procedures on the average detention time and cost. Using data from Oregon's civil commitment process, the authors present several examples of the practical application of their methodology and conclude with a discussion of its major administrative and research implications.