Colonial legacies and economic growth

Much of the work on colonialism has been theoretical or anecdotal. In this paper, I close the gap between the literature on development and new growth theory by testing the effect of colonization on subsequent growth and development. In a sample of 63 ex-colonial states from 1961-1990, I find that colonies that were held for longer periods of time than other countries tend to perform better, on average, after independence. Finally, I show that the level of education at the time of independence can help to explain much of the development gap between the former British and French colonies in Africa.     

The provision of public services by government funded decentralized agencies

Public services are often provided by lower level agencies that are funded by higher level government. Since markets for such services do not exist, normal pressures to minimize costs do not operate; indeed, usually these costs are unobservable. We study a principal-agent model which emphasizes the distinction between the financing and provision of public services. Two broad situations are analyzed: (i) the agencies are induced to reveal true costs; and (ii) in addition, to minimize costs, agencies must be induced to exert effort. The characteristics of the optimal funding contract and the marginal cost of public funds are derived in each case.     

Can elite corruption be a legitimate Machiavellian tool in an unruly world? The case of post-conflict Cambodia

Elite corruption may have a significant role in ending conflicts and shaping post-conflict development. This article enquires into the legitimacy accorded to such corruption. It reviews literature on post-conflict Cambodia, seeking evidence that academic commentaries, public opinion or elites themselves regard elite corruption as a legitimate Machiavellian tool for achieving other ends. Corruption has been an element of the style of government adopted by the dominant party in Cambodia, shaping both the achievement of peace and the uneven economic development that followed. Academic commentaries provide some implicit and explicit legitimation of corruption as a means to secure peace and to resist neoliberal policy settings by affording government discretionary resources and power. Meanwhile, public dissatisfaction with elite corruption appears to the most likely source of renewed violent conflict in Cambodia. How elite actors rationalise and legitimise corrupt behaviour remains poorly understood, and is deserving of more attention.     

Educating the Least Informed: Group Endorsements in a Grassroots Campaign

Theories of low-information rationality claim that uninformed voters can compensate for their lack of political knowledge by employing heuristics, such as interest group endorsements, to make voting decisions as if they were fully informed. Critics of low-information rationality contend that politically unaware voters are unlikely to use group endorsements effectively as a heuristic since they are unlikely to know the political relevance of interest groups. We address this debate by entertaining the possibility that contextual information coupled with a source cue may enhance the effectiveness of group endorsements as a heuristic. We test competing expectations with a field experiment conducted during the 2006 election in two highly competitive Pennsylvania statehouse races where a well-known liberal interest group endorsed Democratic candidates and canvassed both core supporters and Republicans believed to be likeminded. Our results reveal that Republicans used the endorsement as a negative voting cue and that the group's endorsement helped some Republicans compensate for their lack of awareness about politics.     

Dimensions of Authority in Oversight Agencies: American and Australian Comparisons

Fraud, waste, and abuse damage public administration. Responding involves law enforcement and best practice administration. Many jurisdictions create watchdog agencies to perform this role. A model, which includes seven dimensions of jurisdiction and authority that policymakers should consider when creating an oversight entity, is presented. The model goes beyond the simple functional jurisdiction, i.e., who is overseen and how oversight occurs. Four subnational watchdog agencies in two countries are examined to demonstrate the trade-offs that occur in each dimension when the agencies are designed. This analysis demonstrates there are significant balancing issues at stake, which impact watchdog effectiveness.