President Museveni and the politics of presidential tenure in Uganda

There are various reasons why President Museveni is so determined to hold on to power in Uganda. These are similar to the ones motivating other African presidents seeking to entrench themselves in office. Museveni believes he is indispensable for Uganda's stability and prosperity, especially in a country devastated by bad leadership in earlier post-independence decades. Moreover, Museveni and his close allies are fearful of being prosecuted under a new president for alleged wrongdoings.

Opposition to Museveni's continued stay in power has come from within the ruling party, as well as other parties and the Buganda kingdom. But, as elsewhere in Africa, the opposition is too weakly developed to challenge Museveni effectively. Also, presidential manipulations, election rigging, and coercive measures have helped to secure Museveni's grip on power. In particular, Museveni has used the military to entrench himself in office.

Moreover, as in some African countries, international pressures to force Museveni to relinquish power are limited. In fact, donors have propped up a quasi-authoritarian regime with large amounts of resources. Museveni has overseen a prolonged period of economic and political stability and donors argue he deserves their support, even when his record on democracy and good governance is tainted.

In Africa, presidential incumbents who have stepped down have done so because of the strength of domestic and international pressures. Where political opposition is organised and united or where international donors use their aid to promote greater democratisation, then leaders are more likely to abandon plans to stay in power. It is the absence of such conditions and pressures that are leading to the creation of a life presidency in Uganda.     

Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains

The purpose of the present paper is to explore both the motivation for confiscating illegal gain and also to look at some of its legal aspects and economic effects. It is argued that the removal of illegal gain may be able to play a significant complementary role, if only by closing the gap between the maximum punishment the law will allow and fines sufficient to represent a credible deterrent. The paper develops a deterrence model and applies it to confiscation powers introduced to help combat drug trafficking.     

Who graduates from drug courts? Correlates of client success

Drug courts combine punishment and treatment to provide an intermediate sanction for offenders. This paper contains an analysis of drug court case files for 196 participants in one mid-Atlantic jurisdiction. Logistic regression reveals that employment status before and during the program, race, education, and referral time are significant predictors of successful completion. Policy implications and suggestions about participant screening and program administration are offered. The authors would like to thank the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions.     

Eu Programme Management 1977‐96: A Performance Indicators Analysis

Measuring the performance of public services and programmes is now a generally accepted part of the scenery of public management. In practice, it is often honoured more in the breach than the observance owing to well‐known technical and epistemological problems. In the absence of reliable performance data, normative assumptions may prevail on policy makers and managers alike which are at variance with objective reality. The critique and attempted reform of EU programme management is often based on such assumptions. This paper attempts to provide an empirical and epistemological basis to the judgment of EU programme management by identifying appropriate performance indicators, collecting data on them from audit reports over a 20‐year period and constructing a methodology for analysis. Criteria for reliable sources and the effect of intervening variables on the results are discussed. The paper reviews the evidence of the aggregate data collected for the five major EU spending areas, and suggests some conclusions questioning both commonly held assumptions about, and models for, the reform of EU programme management.     

Jurors' use of probabilistic evidence

Mock jurors' use of probabilistic evidence was examined in a fractional factorial design manipulating 7 variables: strength of nonstatistical evidence; quantification of nonstatistical evidence; strength of statistical evidence; combination of 2 pieces of statistical evidence; instruction in use of Bayes' theorem; and presentation of fallacies (both prosecutor's and defense attorney's) concerning use of statistical evidence. One hundred eighty-nine subjects viewed 1 of 16 videotapes presenting a condensed mock trial. Subjects completed dependent measures after each of 4 witnesses and at the end of trial. The strength of both nonstatistical and probabilistic evidence affected verdicts; the other manipulations did not. Overall, subjects slightly underused the probabilistic evidence, as compared to their individualized Bayesian norms, and subjects did not succumb to fallacies. However, subjects greatly varied in over-or underutilization, even after Bayesian instruction. Future research should examine use of weak nonstatistical evidence, and should test different probabilistic instructions.     

Manpower impacts of changes in federal budget priorities

This paper presents the results obtained from computer simulations conducted to determine the sentitivity of occupational employment demands to shifting patterns of U.S. Federal expenditures. The general model utilized is described and the effects of four hypothesized shifts in national priorities upon U. S. manpower requirements in the early 1960's are estimated. Selected occupations are classified and ranked according to their sensitivity to changing patterns of resource allocation between military and civilian activities. From these findings implications for economic and manpower forecasting are derived and discussed.