Reconstructing post-war Lebanon: A challenge to the liberal peace?

This piece uses the example of reconstruction following the July–August 2006 Israeli–Hezbollah war in Lebanon to reflect on the existence of alternatives to the liberal peace. The term ‘liberal peace’ is used as shorthand for internationally-sponsored peace-support and reconstruction interventions and it is marked by its increasingly formulaic, top–down and ethnocentric nature. Two significant non-western actors were apparent in Lebanon's post-war reconstruction: the Gulf States and Jihad Al Bina (the reconstruction wing of Hezbollah). Using fieldwork, this article examines the extent to which the reconstruction activities of these non-western actors constitute an alternative to the liberal peace. It finds that these activities do not have the critical mass or ambition to form a fully-fledged alternative but argues that they reveal serious limitations in the liberal peace approach to post-war reconstruction.     

Ideology and Anti‐Utopia

A recent film adaptation of Aldous Huxley’s novel, Brave New World, makes a number of seemingly minor changes in the novel’s characters, setting, and plot. Together, however, these changes transform the novel’s theme into its polar opposite. As a result, the dystopian novel is transmuted into an anti‐utopian film. After examining these changes in detail, I analyze the contrasting world views that lie behind the two texts and argue that they are based upon opposing views of human nature and society. I then reflect on the meaning of this transformation, arguing that it reflects a fundamental transformation in our society, one which undermines the possibility of using political action to attain social justice. Moreover, it is just this transformation which Huxley, in writing Brave New World, had hoped to warn us against.     

The law and practice in maritime boundary delimitation: lessons for the resolution of dispute between Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana

Definitions of terrorism in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries tend to provide that behaviour can constitute terrorism only if it is politically, religiously or ideologically motivated. Critics argue that this complicates prosecutions, distorts trials, and encourages racial profiling. Defenders argue that the requirement helps yield a definition which corresponds to common understandings of what terrorism entails, and limits the danger of terrorism‐related powers being abused. Part 1 of this article examines the antecedents of the requirement, part 2 examines its legal significance, and part 3 argues that it is unnecessary and undesirable. While many of the criticisms of the motivation requirement are either unpersuasive or exaggerated, defences of the requirement are not altogether convincing. While the requirement excludes from the definition some behaviour which ought not be treated as terrorism, it also excludes some socially dangerous activities which should be.