Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance

Mutually beneficial agreements might fail if the parties fear contractual opportunism. Litigation is supposed to be a remedy, but it gives scope for another kind of opportunistic behavior, which we call litigational opportunism: Even known that the opponent has fulfilled his obligations, a party might bring suit. We introduce a new concept, called judicial detection skill, and show that positive judicial detection skill is a prerequisite if the court system is to deter opportunistic suits and simultaneously induce bilateral contractual compliance. The traditional literature on litigation either assumes judges with zero detection skill, or simply neglects that opportunistic suits might be successful. We prove that those models are unable to provide an answer to the question of how to prevent both types of opportunism simultaneously.     

Pedagogy of regulation: Strategies and instruments to supervise learning from adverse events

Diverse scholars have argued that standards and performance measurements are “instruments of control” that have a profound influence on the day‐to‐day lives of individuals and organizations, causing constitutive effects. Regulatory bodies increasingly use standards to oversee and monitor the regulated. This paper discusses the Dutch Health and Youth Care Inspectorate's use of both standards and a performance measurement system introduced to monitor how Dutch hospitals investigate and learn from serious adverse events. Rather than focusing on how standards affect regulated practices and organizations, our study examines how the use of these instruments affects the standard maker, that is, the Inspectorate. We explore how the Inspectorate's work practices, standards, and coupled performance measurement system influence its regulatory pedagogy, reviewing practices, and decisionmaking. We conclude that standards and performance measurement systems are not by definition “instruments of control” as their constitutive effects are (under)determined by the relationships in which they are enacted.     

Swabs as DNA Collection Devices for Sampling Different Biological Materials from Different Substrates

Currently, there is a variety of swabs for collection of biological evidence from crime scenes, but their comparative efficiency is unknown. Here, we report the results of an investigation into the efficiency of different swab types to collect blood, saliva and touch DNA from a range of substrates. The efficiency of extracting blood and saliva from each swab type was also tested. Some swabs were significantly more effective than others for sampling biological materials from different substrates. Swabs with the highest sampling efficiency, however, often did not have the highest extraction efficiency. Observations were recorded regarding practicality of each swab in a variety of situations. Our study demonstrates that selection of sampling device impacts greatly upon successful collection and extraction of DNA. We present guidelines to assist in evaluation of swab choice.     

Social darwinism and the taylor system: a missing link in the evolution of management?

Whereas linkages between Social Darwinism and Frederick Taylor's system of Scientific Management have been noted, there has been little elaboration on the relationship. In this paper, the parallels between the Social Darwinist theory of Herbert Spencer and the major tenets of Taylorism are explored. By the early 20th Century, members of the business community and leaders of organized labor had developed very different attitudes toward the principle of “survival of the fittest.” These opinions, informed by the prevailing ethos of society, appear to have colored business's and labor's reactions to Taylor's Scientific Management system. In addition, management historians may have developed different views concerning the strength of the relationship between Social Darwinism and Scientific Management because of the various forms of Social Darwinist theory.     

'Management by Contract': A Study of Programmatic and Technological Aspects

The practice of 'Management by Contract' can — as with any practice — be characterized by programmatic and technological dimensions. These dimensions contain concepts and ideas at the programmatic level, which shape the mission of the practice (concrete tasks and routines) at the technological level. Thus, the former attach the practice to the broader conceptual dimension. In this paper both of these dimensions will be analysed. The aim is to study how quality issues have been managed by contract. The first part presents some of the conceptual arguments of 'Management by Contract'. The arguments of a structure generally used (the Purchaser/Provider split) and a method often used (competitive tendering) will be discussed. The second part presents some technological effects through empirical findings. The paper concludes with an analysis of the interaction or non-interaction between these two dimensions.     

Understanding institutional change: Fast-moving and slow-moving institutions

Studies in Comparative International Development - This article proposes a classification of ‘slow-moving” and “fast-moving” institutions, and discusses the potential...