全文获取类型
收费全文 | 81篇 |
免费 | 1篇 |
专业分类
外交国际关系 | 1篇 |
法律 | 22篇 |
政治理论 | 59篇 |
出版年
2020年 | 1篇 |
2018年 | 1篇 |
2016年 | 1篇 |
2014年 | 1篇 |
2013年 | 1篇 |
2012年 | 1篇 |
2008年 | 3篇 |
2004年 | 1篇 |
2003年 | 3篇 |
2002年 | 1篇 |
2001年 | 1篇 |
2000年 | 2篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 4篇 |
1997年 | 5篇 |
1996年 | 6篇 |
1995年 | 5篇 |
1994年 | 7篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 5篇 |
1989年 | 5篇 |
1988年 | 2篇 |
1987年 | 2篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1984年 | 3篇 |
1983年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 4篇 |
1977年 | 1篇 |
1969年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有82条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
2.
The social welfare effects of legislatures in presidential systems, such as the U.S. Congress, are frequently lamented. In response, there are proposals to reform the separation of powers system by giving presidents control of the legislative agenda and weakening rules such as the filibuster. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of the policy and social welfare consequences of a more executive-centric system. Integrating standard assumptions about legislative and executive incentives into a dynamic model of decision making with private investment, we show there are a variety of conditions under which stronger executives do not produce better outcomes. Moreover, we characterize how these conditions depend on factors such as the stability of the policymaking environment or investment fundamentals. Our findings are robust and consistent with empirical observations that U.S. policy outputs are not necessarily worse than those of nations with stronger executives, which more closely approximate prominent proposals by populist-oriented reformers. 相似文献
3.
4.
A pervasive theme of the congressional politics literature is that the committee system is fundamental in determining the policy status quo. Such an assertion hinges crucially upon committees controlling their jurisdictions; congressional delegation is undermined if a committee can assert authority over any issue domain at any time. Yet, representatives may possess an incentive to support a policy proposal that would change the status quo, even if it entails disregarding procedures. Indeed, standard conceptualizations of how members of Congress make their voting choices assume that only the benefits and costs associated with a policy matter, and they do not consider institutional factors such as whether a bill emerged from the correct committee.This analysis examines whether representatives will sacrifice policy interests to preserve institutional features of the legislature. The effort in 1987 to curb smoking on airplanes — which became embroiled in a difficult-to-resolve jurisdictional dispute — serves as a vehicle to analyze how sensitive members are to such features. The results demonstrate that a sizable number put aside their [generally moderate] policy preferences and voted against limits on smoking for institutional reasons. These findings have important implications both for specifying the determinants of policy change and for understanding institutional stability. 相似文献
5.
6.
7.
Privatization and cost reduction 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Janet Rothenberg Pack 《Policy Sciences》1989,22(1):1-25
In this paper several examples of government contracts with private firms are examined to see how experience conforms to a principal-agent model of cost minimization via competitive bidding and how important are the many qualifications to the model. Fifteen cases of local government contracting are examined.The course of private contracting is not always smooth — as judged by the many contract disruptions observed and by the number of cities that believe they are no longer saving money by contracting and those which have resumed public production. It also seems to be the case, however, that competition generally reduces initial costs, that in many cases cost savings persist, that it is possible to stimulte competition, and that providing for continual interaction, as contrasted with simply monitoring performance, can prevent disruption. 相似文献
8.
9.
Janet Rothenberg Pack 《Public Choice》1988,58(2):101-122
Although the common belief is that the Congress has paid little attention to fiscal policy, the same kinds of political-economic models which have been used to explain presidential budgetary policy may be used equally well to explain congressional budgetary behavior. The Congress' fiscal policy appears to be systematically sensitive to both economic and political factors. Changes in the unemployment rate have a major impact on congressional budgetary policy. As for political factors, the President's lead is followed most closely on revenue proposals and not at all on the expenditure side. The electoral cycle, in particular the off-year congressional election year, is also important; inducing larger deficits and smaller increases in revenues. When the influences on congressional fiscal behavior are compared with those on presidential behavior, the sources of the generally more expansionary congressional fiscal policy are identified. Congressional budget deficits increase in response to increased rates of unemployment but are insensitive to increases in inflation. In contrast, presidential budgets are heavily influenced by inflation and the growth in personal income — increases in each resulting in smaller proposed deficits — as well as by unemployment rates. In years in which both unemployment and inflation are increasing, the combination of the two (assuming a one percentage point change in each) implies an increase in the congressional deficit of $6.7 billion but a decrease in the president's proposed deficit of $2.5 billion. The implications of this study are a challenge to the literature which makes the President the central actor in macro-economic policy. 相似文献
10.