State support under the new federalism

The new federalism will reduce total intergovernmental revenues to local governments. The reduction will be due to both the transfer to the states of much of the federal aid which previously flowed directly to local governments and reductions in total federal aid levels. Pass-through requirements on the shifted aid will not affect this general result but may soften the impact in many states. Because of differences in the extent to which state governments substitute federal pass-through aid for state aid from own-source revenues and in the degree to which different sources of revenues are treated differently by the states, local revenue reductions will vary greatly from state to state. The losses for local governments will range from 100% of the shifted aid in some states to as little as 15–20% in others.     

The states' scramble for federal funds: Who wins,who loses?

Interstate differences between federal expenditures and receipts are very large, generally favoring the southern and western states. The more slowly growing states of the northeast and midwest point to these imbalances as one source of their economic difficulties. The major source of disparity lies in revenue patterns, not in expenditure allocations. Reallocating federal expenditures on an equal per capita basis would reduce regional disparities in flows of federal funds by only about 25 percent. The principal regional beneficiary of equalized expenditures would be the midwest states of the Great Lakes region. However, contrary to the expectations of proponents of such redistribution, the southeastern states would also be major beneficiaries while the larger states of the mideast and New England would be hurt. Selective expenditure changes might be targeted more effectively to individual regions or states; but finding consistent, generally acceptable principles upon which to base such changes is a formidable problem.     

The Elusive Search for Presidential Power

Unilateral presidential actions, such as executive orders, are widely cited as a key strategic tool for presidential power. However, is unilateral action evidence of unilateralism or might it represent executive acquiescence? We answer this by (1) specifying three competing models, each with a different presidential discretion assumption and generating alternative hypotheses; (2) extending the canonical item‐response model to best measure executive‐order significance; and (3) comparing competing theoretical models to data for 1947–2002. Theoretically, we show that legislative preferences may impact unilateral actions differently than previously thought and indicate how parties may be influential. Empirically, a model where the president is responsive to the chamber's majority‐party median fits the data better than models assuming responsiveness to the chamber median or no presidential acquiescence. Unilateral action appears not tantamount to presidential power, as evidence implies that legislative parties, or the judicial actors enforcing their will, are key conditioning factors.