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Janet Rothenberg Pack 《Journal of policy analysis and management》1999,18(3):359-359
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The Who,When, and Where of Executive Nominations: Integrating Agency Independence and Appointee Ideology
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Gary E. Hollibaugh Jr. Lawrence S. Rothenberg 《American journal of political science》2018,62(2):296-311
In recent years, scholars have expended considerable efforts to understand the executive appointment process and the forces influencing the choices made by the president and the Senate. However, some factors integral to theoretical models have not been well integrated empirically, and other relevant factors have not been incorporated much at all. Here, we focus on one determinant corresponding to the former critique—nominee ideology—and another corresponding to the latter—the independence of decision makers in the targeted agencies. We examine a series of theoretically driven hypotheses regarding the effects of both ideology and independence on who gets nominated and if and when nominees are eventually confirmed. Results show nominee ideology and decision maker independence matter a great deal and factor into presidential strategic choices and senatorial responses in ways according to expectations. Our findings have important ramifications for understanding appointments empirically and for future theoretical development. 相似文献
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There has been much discussion about how members of Congressdesire money early in the campaign season. However, theoreticalmodels of how contributions are allocated during the electoralcycle have been lacking. Our analysis attempts to remedy thisgap by providing and testing a model which specifies how theprocess of bargaining between members of Congress and organizedinterests produces the pattern of donations observed over thecourse of the electoral cycle. Most notably, our results suggestthat strategic incumbents can receive money early in the campaignif they desire but that they are generally unwilling to paythe price of lower aggregate fundraising and greater provisionof access. These findings buttress earlier empirical findingsthat question the instrumental value of early money. In addition,our results highlight that contribution choices are fundamentallyinfluenced by short-term factors, especially electoral conditions,that do not lend themselves to the routinized behavior necessaryfor contributors to invest in incumbents for long-run payoffs. 相似文献
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