The politics of bureaucratic competition: The case of natural resource policy

Many concerned with how government functions consider creating competition between bureaucracies an attractive option. Others are skeptical of what impact rival agencies have when they are operating within a political context. Reflecting these discrepant viewpoints, some scholars believe that regulators will compete vigorously for resources and responsibilities; others assert that agency members will act passively as they attempt to protect their autonomy. To assess these contrasting perspectives and determine why competitive agency structures might exist, the following analysis examines one of the classic situations where agencies can serve as functional substitutes: the relationship between the United States Forest Service and the National Park Service. The results demonstrate that agencies put far more weight on autonomy than competition. The principal advantage of functional rivalry for politicians—at least where federal lands are concerned—is to expand the choice set of alternatives available to them.     

Life space and social networks as political contexts

Based on data collected in the course of the September and November 1980 waves of the National Election Studies, this contextual analysis of interpersonal relations in social networks presents two major findings: First, the neighborhood as a geographical unit does not appear to be a perceptually salient environment for political behavior; and second,particular neighbors, individually linked to a voter, appear to constitute a social network that has an independent impact on partisan affect for the political parties and their candidates as well as on stability or change in vote preferences as the electoral season goes forward. Thus, although the neighborhood appears to be of minor importance as a politicalenvironment, social relations among particular neighbors result in an interpersonalcontext that has an impact on political behavior.This article is being published simultaneously as Chapter 12 in Heinz Eulau,Politics, Self and Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress). Copyright 1986 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.     

National Support For Regional Review: Federal Compliance and The Future of Intergovernmental Coordination

In 1969, OMB issued Circular A-95 to broaden the "confidentialexchange" between applicants and federal agencies, to providestate and local clearinghouses an opportunity to review federalassistance applications. Because President Reagan recently signedExecutive Order 12372 revoking A-95 and making states responsiblefor procedures governing regional coordination of federal programs,this is a useful time to analyze and evaluate the A-95 experience.Any review process somehow must solve the three critical, overlappingproblems which plagued A-95 from the outset: unpredictable andinsufficient funding, vague review criteria, and poor federalcompliance. This article focuses on federal noncompliance: theextent of agency violations, structural and political reasonsfor noncompliance, and the success of efforts to modify andimprove the system. The study draws on a 1981 survey of RegionV areawide clearinghouses and the author's experience as a 1980–1981NASPAA Faculty Fellow with the Chicago Federal Regional Council.     

The Search for Comparability: Response to Binder

Lawrence S. Rothenberg Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 e-mail: lrot{at}mail.rochester.edu (corresponding author) Binder (n.d., Taking the measure of Congress: Reply to Chiouand Rothenberg. Political Analysis. Forthcoming) highlightsareas of agreement and disagreement with our discussion of preferencemeasurement and legislative gridlock. We now both agree thatW-NOMINATE scores—employed in Binder (1999, The dynamicsof legislative gridlock. American Political Science Review 9:519–33)to measure key independent variables, including bicameral differences—shouldnot be used when examining multichamber legislatures over time.We continue to disagree over whether Common Space scores orBinder's conference vote measure is superior. In this response,we show that, although several of the theoretical and statisticalobjections that Binder (n.d.) raises to our Common Space measuredo not apply, they are all relevant for her conference voteanalog. Additionally, we detail how, despite protests to thecontrary, the conference vote measure is plagued by insufficientdata. Finally, we demonstrate how new efforts to show that Binder's (1999)results continue to hold are not robust.