Transition in agriculture: Empirical indicators and results (evidence from Punjab,India)

In this paper, the author studies the impact of agricultural transition on certain well‐known empirical relationships that have, so far, been identified with backward agriculture. The study tests the relation between farm size and productivity to see if the inverse relation breaks down with the advent of new technology. Farm size is also related to several other variables in an analysis of agricultural transformation. Using recent data the results indicate that: the historically more advanced regions exhibit a positive relation between farm size and productivity; in regions which have been recently transformed the relation is neither significantly negative nor positive, and in the relatively backward areas the inverse relation still prevails. Corresponding changes in other variables also tend to reflect the nature and extent of transition in agriculture.     

The election timing advantage: Empirical fact or fiction?

Do non-fixed election dates in Westminster parliamentary democracies create an unfair incumbent advantage? The consensus in the literature is that the incumbent party can gain an advantage at the ballot box by controlling election timing (Bakvis, 2001; Docherty, 2010; Smith, 2004; White, 2005; Wolinetz, 2005). Surprisingly, however, there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this claim. We address this lacuna by providing an empirical test of whether the election-timing power matters for incumbent vote support. We do so by employing an innovative web-based voting experiment. Our findings show that the government does gain an advantage by timing an election when it is to their advantage, but the context is limited to conditions where the election follows immediately after a heightened level of positive government coverage.     

Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Transfers in Less Developed Countries

This article addresses the issue of fiscal decentralizationin developing countries, and the use of intergovernmental transfersto achieve this objective. We find that developing countrieshave more centralized fiscal structures and argue that thisis consistent with the theory of fiscal federalism. Economicdevelopment, however, does push the advantage toward decentralization.We also show that developing countries use a wide variety oftransfer instruments to fund local governments, and that theseinstruments give the national government varying degrees ofcontrol over local government finances.