Selection procedure and responses to affirmative action

Although it has been recognized that a large number of issues linked to the social policy of affirmative action are of a social psychological nature, research investigating such issues has not considered the social psychological importance of implementation procedures. Social policy analysts have differentiated implementation procedures on the degree to which they include relevant achievement criteria. In the present research this differentiation is couched within the theoretical framework of procedural justice and is utilized to critique the work of Austin et al. (1977). These researchers investigated the responses of individuals favorably treated in an affirmative action like situation and conclude that affirmative action is evaluated as absolutely unfair by these individuals. Based on the critique, a 2 (qualifications)×2 (history of discrimination)×2 (procedure) role play experiment was conducted. The results of the experiment unambiguously support the hypothesis that implementation procedure will greatly affect a variety of individual responses such as general affect, evaluations of procedural fairness, evaluations of outcome fairness, and evaluations of a relevant subunit of the involved institution.This article is based in part on a dissertation submitted to the Department of Psychology at the University of North Carolina in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. Special thanks are extended to the members of the dissertation committee, Drs. John Thibaut (Chair), David Eckerman, Chester A. Insko, Lynn Kahle, and John Schopler.     

MERIT VERSUS KINSHIP: A CATEGORY MISTAKE? THE CASE OF THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL SERVICE

Acceptance of merit's pivotal role in establishing and maintaining effective bureaucracies has become second nature. In this paper I explore the association between merit and kinship in the Philippine civil service, although the conclusions that emerge are not peculiar either to the case of the Philippines or to the ‘developing’ world in general. I argue that merit is no less social than kinship; that its meaning for actors is broader, and the value of kinship and other ‘traditional’ social categories of behavior greater, than commentators and reformers often allow for. Indeed, when merit is narrowly defined (as it so often must be for practical reasons) and its complex dimensions ignored, it is socially divisive, produces deep inequalities, and leaves organizations less flexible and less capable of innovation. I suggest that, however paradoxical it might seem, more effective, humanitarian, flexible, and creative organizations thrive in what is often portrayed as an unsatisfactory transitional state between third‐world informality and Weberian‐style formality. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.