Identifying the origins of welsh local government reform

Although those within Welsh local government circles were aware that the Welsh Office was considering restructuring local government as early as December 1990, the first the general population knew of the proposed changes was in June 1991. It was in that month that the Welsh Secretary produced a consultation paper entitled The Structure of Local Government in Wales. ¹ This advocated the introduction of unitary authorities throughout Wales. The publication of this consultation paper was at the same time as those for Scotland² and England.³ This gave the impression that Wales was merely following events in England and Scotland. Such an assumption remains widespread. In the first part of his article ‘Legislating for Wales ‐ Local Government (Wales) Act 1994’ Paul Griffiths indicated that the local government changes in Wales were unplanned and perhaps unintended and a reaction to changes occurring in England.⁴ This article aims to shed more light on the background behind Welsh local government reform. It indicates that the changes in Welsh local government were more a matter of coincidence than merely a mirror of those happening elsewhere. It also argues that the changes in Wales have their own unique Welsh origins, and that the changes may well have occurred, regardless of what happened in the rest of the United Kingdom.     

American security policy and NATO's future

NATO remains the United States’ principal instrument for shaping the security environment in Europe. It acts as a long‐run hedge against a possible resurrected Russian threat to the continent and to dampen the prospects for the renationalization of military and security policies in Europe. The United States faces formidable challenges to ensure the viability of NATO after the Cold War. Washington must be prepared to engage in a grand balancing act on several fronts to perpetuate the Alliance. It must support NATO enlargement to move the Alliance's geopolitical center eastward, but not to territory that would practically indefensible in the event of a resurgent Russia. Out‐of‐area operations will preoccupy Alliance attention in the near‐future, but too great an appetite for undertaking peacekeeping missions might over time substantially erode the Alliance's ability to deter or withstand the political and military pressure from a resurgent Russia or major power or coalition on the outlying areas of the Eurasian landmass.     

The Spatial Distribution of Postblast RDX Residue: Forensic Implications

Locating exactly where trace explosive residue samples should be sought during sample collection at bomb scenes is not specified in the published literature or guidelines; in this area, it is generally acknowledged that forensic practices are based on tradition rather than evidence. This study investigated patterns in the spatial distribution of postblast 1,3,5‐trinitro‐1,3,5‐triazocyclohexane residue from a series of unconfined detonations, over a range of sampling sites, and at two different detonation heights. The amount of residue recovered from the sites decreased as a function of distance from the center of the explosion. [Correction added after online publication 27 December 2012: In the preceding sentence, “increased” was corrected to “decreased” to agree with the conclusion of the article.] As the height of the detonations increased, more residues were found from all sampling sites. The findings of this empirical study have a number of important practical implications including determining where residue samples are best sought at crime scenes.     

A New Method of Assessing Judicial Workload in Juvenile Dependency Cases

This article describes a new method for calculating judicial workload in dependency or child abuse and neglect cases. In contrast to traditional judicial workload methods, the method described herein produces estimates of judicial workload that take into account the complex role of the juvenile dependency court judge—a role that includes both on‐ and off‐the‐bench activities. The method provides workload estimates that give guidance to courts not only about the minimally sufficient judicial resources needed to accommodate current caseload needs, but also what level of judicial resources would be required to hold substantive dependency court hearings that comport with nationally recognized practice recommendations. The article reviews commonly used judicial workload methods, outlines the new method, and uses a pilot of the method as an example of how the method works in practice. Broader implications of this workload method are also discussed.     

Book reviews

Christian Democracy in Western Germany. By Geoffrey Pridham. London: Croom Helm, 1977. Pp. 371. £9.95.

The Power of the Purse: The Role of European Parliaments in Budgetary Decisions. By David Coombes et al. PEP, Allen &; Unwin, 1976. Pp. 393. £12.00.

Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg. By Bradley F. Smith. London: Andre Deutsch, 1977. Pp. xviii+349. Illus., Index, Biblio. £6.50.

Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo‐Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans. Background, Execution, Consequences. By Alfred de Zayas. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. Pp. xxvii+268. £5.95.

Innen‐ und Aussenpolitik unter nationalsozialistischer Bedrohung: Deter‐minanten internationaler Beziehungen in historischen Fallstudien. Edited by Erhard Forndran, Frank Golczewski and Dieter Riesenberger. Opladen: West Deutscher Verlag, 1977. Pp. 361, DM 49.

The Illusion of Peace: International Relations in Europe, 1918–1933. By Sally Marks. London: Macmillan, 1976. Pp. 184; £5.95, £2.95 paper.

French Society 1789–1970. By Georges Dupeux. London: Methuen &; Co, 1976. Pp. ix+294. £7.50, Paperback £3.90.

Strategic de la grève. By Bertrand Badie. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977. Pp. xi+263. Fr. 78.

A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962. By Alistair Horne. Mac‐millan 1977. Pp. 604. £8.95.

Les Politiques Extérieures Européenes dans la Crise. Edited by Alfred Grosser. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976. Pp. 198. Fr. 85.

L'Avenir est Notre Affaire. By Denis de Rougemont. Paris: Editions Stock, 1977. Pp. 375.

Les Sommets de l'Etat: Essai sur l'élite du pouvoir en France. By Pierre Birnbaum. Paris: Editions due Seuil, 1977. Pp. 188.

Planning and Politics: The British Experience 1970–76. By Michael Shanks. PEP, George Allen and Unwin, 1977. Pp. 142. £6.50 hardback, £2.95 paperback.

Politische Planungssyteme. Edited by Frieder Naschold and Werner Vath. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1973. Pp. 478. DM. 19,80.

Einführung in das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. By Frank Pilz. Munich: Beck'sche Elementarbücher, Verlag C.H. Beck, 1977. Pp. 366. DM. 28,—.

Soziologie und Sozialpolitik. Edited by Christian von Ferber and Franz Xaver Kaufmann. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977. Pp. 649. DM. 64,—

The British Cabinet. By John P. Mackintosh. Stevens, 1977 (Third Edition). Pp. xv+656. £5.75.

The History of Political Thought: A Short Introduction. By R. N. Berki. London: J. M. Dent and Son, 1977. Bibliography and Index. Pp. vi+216. £2.95.

France Today: Introductory Studies. Edited by J. E. Flower. London: Methuen, 1977 (Third edition rev.). Pp. vi+190. £2.75 paperback.

Det utrolige dognet (The incredible day). By Bjorn Bjornsen. Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1977. Pp. 304.     

A weak pillar for American national security: The CIA's dismal performance against WMD threats

American preemptive or preventive military action against WMD-armed adversaries in the future will simply not be feasible without high-quality and timely intelligence. But is American intelligence up to this load-bearing task for the post-11 September national security? This article surveys the Central Intelligence Agency's record of gauging potential WMD threats for more than a decade and assesses its overall performance as dismal. The CIA's recent intelligence debacle against Iraq was one of the greatest in a long series of failures that has publicly exposed the Agency's profound weaknesses. These intelligence failures were due in large measure to the CIA's poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied alone by the creation of the new Director of National Intelligence post. This article recommends steps needed to increase the quality of intelligence produced by CIA, or elsewhere in the new intelligence community, to move American intelligence in lockstep with military transformation to give the Commander-in-Chief realistic options for countering hostile nation-states or terrorist groups seeking or acquiring WMD.