Why Do Soldiers Give Up? A Self-Preservation Theory of Surrender

Surrender, or capitulation to the adversary in combat, can have a significant impact on the duration, intensity, and outcomes of battles and wars. Yet the reasons why soldiers choose to capitulate are not well understood. This article advances a new theory of surrender that argues soldiers are most likely to surrender when they perceive proximate environmental signals leading them to expect humane treatment and a relatively short period of captivity and least likely to give up when those signals lead them to expect abusive treatment and lengthy imprisonment. The model is tested through a detailed examination of surrender rates in World War I and findings indicate that it explains more of the observed variation than do existing theories of capitulation. What little systematic data exists on surrenders during twentieth century interstate wars corroborates these findings. Implications for scholars and policymakers are briefly considered.     

Advisers and Decisions 1976*

On 13 December 1975 the Liberal‐Country party coalition led by Malcolm Fraser conclusively won a double dissolution election with large majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives. The following year, 1976, was a year of policy debates – debates about economic policy, foreign policy, family policy, health policy (especially Medibank), uranium and the environment, human rights and Aboriginal land policy in particular. They were, in reality, political struggles over the direction of the country and the ideas and philosophy that would govern the course of policy. At the core of government there was an epic battle between the Prime Minister and the government's senior advisers in the Treasury, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Significant battles over foreign policy were modest compared with struggles over economic policy and the quest to control inflation. Debate came to a head with a devaluation of the dollar in the face of official advice. Among the consequences were division of the Treasury and creation of the Department of Finance, greater independence of the Reserve Bank and a confirmation of the need for elected leaders to have their own political staffs.     

Using Bayesian Aldrich‐McKelvey Scaling to Study Citizens' Ideological Preferences and Perceptions

Aldrich‐McKelvey scaling is a powerful method that corrects for differential‐item functioning (DIF) in estimating the positions of political stimuli (e.g., parties and candidates) and survey respondents along a latent policy dimension from issue scale data. DIF arises when respondents interpret issue scales (e.g., the standard liberal‐conservative scale) differently and distort their placements of the stimuli and themselves. We develop a Bayesian implementation of the classical maximum likelihood Aldrich‐McKelvey scaling method that overcomes some important shortcomings in the classical procedure. We then apply this method to study citizens' ideological preferences and perceptions using data from the 2004–2012 American National Election Studies and the 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. Our findings indicate that DIF biases self‐placements on the liberal‐conservative scale in a way that understates the extent of polarization in the contemporary American electorate and that citizens have remarkably accurate perceptions of the ideological positions of senators and Senate candidates.     

Examining Legislative Cue‐Taking in the US Senate

We examine congressional cue‐taking theory to determine its extent, conditionality, and various forms in the US Senate. Using a novel data‐collection technique (timed C‐SPAN footage), we focus on temporal dynamics via event history analysis. Examining the effects of senator characteristics across 16 votes from the 108th Congress, we find that committee leadership and seniority generally predict cue‐giving, while other types of characteristics predict cue‐giving on certain types of votes. Our results underscore the importance of considering the order and timing of voting when studying congressional behavior.     

Objective Analysis of Impressed Chisel Toolmarks

Historical and recent challenges to the practice of comparative forensic examination have created a driving force for the formation of objective methods for toolmark identification. In this study , fifty sequentially manufactured chisels were used to create impression toolmarks in lead (500 toolmarks total). An algorithm previously used to statistically separate known matching and nonmatching striated screwdriver marks and quasi-striated plier marks was used to evaluate the chisel marks. Impression toolmarks, a more complex form of toolmark, pose a more difficult test for the algorithm that was originally designed for striated toolmarks. Results show in this instance that the algorithm can separate matching and nonmatching impression marks, providing further validation of the assumption that toolmarks are identifiably unique.