Model specification in the analysis of spatial dependence

The recent surge in studies analysing spatial dependence in political science has gone hand‐in‐hand with increased attention paid to the choice of estimation technique. In comparison, specification choice has been relatively neglected, even though it leads to equally, if not more, serious inference problems. In this article four specification issues are analysed. It is argued that to avoid biased estimates of the spatial effects, researchers need to consider carefully how to model temporal dynamics, common trends and common shocks, as well as how to account for spatial clustering and unobserved spatial heterogeneity. The remaining two specification issues relate to the weighting matrix employed for the creation of spatial effects: whether it should be row‐standardised and what functional form to choose for this matrix. The importance of these specification issues is demonstrated by replicating Hays' model of spatial dependence in international capital tax rate competition. Seemingly small changes to model specification have major impacts on the spatial effect estimates. It is recommended that spatial analysts develop their theories of spatial dependencies further to provide more guidance on the specification of the estimation model. In the absence of sufficiently developed theories, the robustness of results to specification changes needs to be demonstrated.     

Do citizens care about government debt? Evidence from survey experiments on budgetary priorities

Ever since the Great Recession, public debt has become politicised. Some research suggests that citizens are fiscally conservative, while other research shows that they punish governments for implementing fiscal consolidation. This begs the question of whether and how much citizens care about debt. We argue that debt is not a priority for citizens because reducing it involves spending and tax trade-offs. Using a split-sample experiment and a conjoint experiment in four European countries, we show that fiscal consolidation at the cost of spending cuts or taxes hikes is less popular than commonly assumed. Revenue-based consolidation is especially unpopular, but expenditure-based consolidation is also contested. Moreover, the public has clear fiscal policy priorities: People do not favour lower debt and taxes, but they support higher progressive taxes to pay for more government spending. The article furthers our understanding of public opinion on fiscal policies and the likely political consequences of austerity.     

Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document

Constitutional change is often thought of as explicit constitutional change, i.e., as change that implies a modified wording of the constitutional document. In this paper, the possibilities of implicit constitutional change, i.e., change that is not accompanied by formally changing the constitution, are analyzed. The separation of powers a la Montesquieu is taken as a starting point and it will be argued that constitutional change can be brought about by all government branches, i.e., by the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. If this argument is accepted it follows that the judiciary-even when endowed with the competence of judicial review-is not the ultimate arbiter in supervising constitutional change. It is the main hypothesis of this paper that the judiciary in bringing about implicit constitutional change is subject to a number of constraints among which the original document plays a rather marginal role. Instead, it is claimed that the current preferences of the other government organs as well as those of the population are more relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the constitution at a given point in time.     

Institutional constraints on cabinet formation: Veto points and party system dynamics

Research on government formation in parliamentary democracies has presented contradicting evidence on the role of political veto institutions and parliamentary polarization on the formation of cabinet types. Institutional rules may either provide significant leeway for political parties or seriously constrain them when forming sustainable coalitions. In contrast to previous studies we argue that the effect of political institutions is conditional on the degree of polarization in parliament. We test our hypotheses using original data on 842 cabinet formations in 33 advanced democracies between 1945–2018. In line with previous research, we find that the institutional rules have a pronounced effect on the type of cabinet formed, but that institutional rules moderate the effect of party system polarization. Thus, our findings provide important new insights on cabinet formation which are particularly relevant for today's increasingly polarized parliaments.     

Shaky attachments: Individual-level stability and change of partisanship among West German voters, 1984–2001

Abstract.  Individual voters' identification with a political party is believed to be a highly stable core of the political personality, and an 'unmoved mover' of political behaviour. In this article, the authors take advantage of a unique longitudinal database – the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) – to test the basic premise of partisanship's high persistence. Analysing individual-level data from 18 annual panel waves conducted in West Germany between 1984 and 2001, it was found that only a minority of the electorate appears steadfast with regard to partisanship over the entire period. Using event history analysis, the authors demonstrate how movements from partisanship into independence and changes between parties are affected by: personal attributes of voters, especially cognitive mobilisation; by properties of their social contexts, in particular spousal relationships and family constellations; by situational contexts, specifically election campaigns; and by the type of party with which voters identify.     

Can electors combat corruption? Institutional arrangements and citizen behaviour

Studies interested in the cross‐national levels of corruption have concluded that specific institutional characteristics drive the aggregate variation. In countries with high institutional clarity and plurality electoral systems, corruption tends to be lower since increased voter monitoring and clarity of responsibility incentivise politicians to deliver virtuous policies. However, the underlying accountability mechanism has never been tested at the individual level. It is still unclear whether (1) voters do place voting weights on corruption, and (2) whether these weights vary in response to aggregate institutional characteristics. In this article, survey data from 23 democracies is used to put the accountability micro‐mechanism to this test. While there is some evidence that voters do vote on the basis of corruption, the moderating effect of institutional characteristics is not as strong as previously thought.