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51.
The community-driven, decentralised approach to natural resource management has reached a crossroads. The good governance agenda in the water, forestry, fishery and biodiversity sectors has generated limited success in achieving pro-poor outcomes. In many cases, local elites are to blame for capturing the benefits from the process of democratising decision-making processes. This paper examines two approaches in the literature which both aim to address elite domination, namely elite exclusion and elite inclusion. The former is a deliberate act to reduce the influence of elites by excluding them from the decision-making process in natural resource management. The latter, in contrast, is a conscious strategy to integrate elites into the use of natural resources in an attempt to redistribute the benefits to poor people via the ‘trickle down’ effect. This paper argues that the dichotomy of elite inclusion and exclusion is inadequate in understanding the complex local power dynamics in natural resource management. In particular, the binary division fails to address the multiple locations of elites, overlapping institutions and the paradoxes of ‘controlled’ participatory processes. This paper argues that any strategies to tackle elite capture need to pay attention to the historical, socially embedded and negotiated nature of resource governance arrangements.  相似文献   
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Non‐fiction reviews

Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation by Patrick Chabal, New York: St Martin's Press, 1992, pp 311.

Government and Politics in Africa (Second Edition) by William Tordoff Macmillan: London, 1993, pp 340.

The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Sudan by Ali Salih Karrar, London: Hurst, 1992, pp 234, £30

Historical Discord in the Nile Valley by Gabriel R Warburg, London: Hurst, 1992, pp 210, £27.50

The Economy of Ethiopia by Keith Griffin (ed.) London: Macmillan, 1992. pp 299

Le Sahara Occidental‐Enjeu maghrébin by Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, Paris: Karthala 1992, pp 357 FF. 150 Preface by Bernard Cherigny

Fiction reviews

A Thousand and One Coffee Mornings: Scenes From Saudi Arabia by Miranda Miller London: Peter Owen, 1989, pp 207, £12.95pb.

Crisis and Creativity in The New Literatures in English, by Geoffrey Davis and Hena Maes‐Jelinek eds. Cross‐Cultures 1. Amsterdam—Atlanta GA: Editions Rodopi BV. 1990, pp 524, $75

The Great World by David Malouf London: Chatto and Windus, 1990, £12.95

The Wind from the Plain by Yashar Kemal Translated from the Turkish by Thilda Kemal London: Collins Harvill, 1989, pp 286 £6.95pb

Tigers and Butterflies: selected writings on politics culture and society by Han Suyin Edited by Aamer Hussein, London: Earthscan, 1990, pp 247 £9.95pb

Reference reviews

Poverty and Development in the 1990s Edited by Tim Allen and Alan Thomas Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp 21, £30.00 hb, £9.95 pb

Industrialization and Development Edited by Tom Hewitt, Hazel Johnson and Dave Wield Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp 338, £30.00 hb, £9.95 pb

Rural Livelihoods: crises and responses Edited by Henry Bernstein, Ben Crow and Hazel Johnson Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp 324, £30.00 hb, £9.95pb

Dictionary of Third World Terms by Kofi Buenor Hadjor London/New York, NY: I B Tauris, 1992, pp 308 £24.95 hb

Glossary of the Third World: words for understanding Third World people and cultures by George Thomas Kurian, New York, NY/Oxford: Facts on File, 1989, pp 300 £20.00 hb.

Historical Dictionary of Indonesia: Asian Historical Dictionaries, No. 9 by Robert Cribb Metuchen, New Jersey/London: Scarecrow Press 1992. pp 663, £61.65 hb

Wars in the Third World Since 1945 by Guy Arnold London: Cassell, 1991, pp 579, £65.00 hb

The Facts On File WORLD POLITICAL ALMANAC (Second Edition) by Chris Cook New York, NY/Oxford: Facts on File, 1992, pp 490 £25.00 hb

Caribbean Companion: the A to Z reference by Brian Dyde Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillon 1992. 181pp. £4.50 pb

SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp 670. hb

Non‐Governmental Development Organizations of Developing Countries—and the South smiles.... Edited by Sjef Theunis, Dordrech, Holland/Boston, Mass./London: Martinus Nijhoff for Novib, 1991, pp 372, £66.00 hb

Teaching the Geography of Developing Areas, Monograph No. 7 Edited by Robert B. Potter and Tim Unwin, London: Developing Areas Research Group, 1992, pp 143. pb

World Bibliographic Series, Vol. 140: MAURITIUS by Pramila Ramgulam Bennet in collaboration with George John Bennett Oxford/Santa Barbara, California/Denver, Colorado: Clio Press, 1992, pp 153 hb

World Investment Report 1992: transnational corporations as engines of growth United Nations New York, NY: United Nations Publications, 1992, pp 365 $45  相似文献   
53.
Sam Wilkins 《Democratization》2013,20(8):1493-1512
ABSTRACT

This article addresses a question relevant to many non-democratic regimes: how can a successful dominant party be an institutionally weak one? President Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) have dominated Ugandan politics since coming to power in 1986. However, the NRM does not possess many of the institutional endowments that other dominant parties use to control mass and elite politics, such as central control of candidate selection, autonomous mobilizing structures, or dispensation of sufficient political finance to its candidates. Instead, the party secretariat has no real institutional power independent of the personalist Museveni regime, and its local branches house fierce internal competition each election in which most incumbents lose office. This article argues that the NRM mobilizes so well for Museveni despite its institutional deficits due to the precise nature of the competitive process its local elites go through to win its nomination (or “flag”) and the subsequent general election. This process sees self-organized and self-financed candidates and their factions rejuvenate the party and mobilize votes for the concurrent presidential election as a by-product of their competition with one another. The article makes this argument with qualitative data from three districts gathered during the 2016 elections.  相似文献   
54.
Communication apps can be an important source of evidence in a forensic investigation (e.g., in the investigation of a drug trafficking or terrorism case where the communications apps were used by the accused persons during the transactions or planning activities). This study presents the first evidence‐based forensic taxonomy of Windows Phone communication apps, using an existing two‐dimensional Android forensic taxonomy as a baseline. Specifically, 30 Windows Phone communication apps, including Instant Messaging (IM) and Voice over IP (VoIP) apps, are examined. Artifacts extracted using physical acquisition are analyzed, and seven digital evidence objects of forensic interest are identified, namely: Call Log, Chats, Contacts, Locations, Installed Applications, SMSs and User Accounts. Findings from this study would help to facilitate timely and effective forensic investigations involving Windows Phone communication apps.  相似文献   
55.
Work Health and Safety Inspectors are at the forefront of efforts to protect workers from harm from psychosocial hazards, yet the application of regulatory theory to their practice has been limited. Drawing on models of responsive regulation and strategic enforcement, we analyze extensive (N = 46,348) complaint and incident notification data from an Australian Work Health and Safety Inspectorate, to compare Inspectors' responses to psychosocial versus non-psychosocial hazards. We found psychosocial hazards were less likely to be actioned than non-psychosocial hazards. When they were actioned, psychosocial hazards saw more Inspector activity, but fewer enforcement notices than non-psychosocial hazards. These findings are inconsistent with the version of responsive regulation espoused by the regulator. Our theoretical conclusion is that Weil's strategic enforcement approach is likely to offer greater possibilities for guiding future resource allocation.  相似文献   
56.
Statistics describe realities, but they also shape them, since they are used to design or support policies. As such accurate statistics are important. Using the agricultural sector in Rwanda as a case study, we demonstrate that dubious statistics can spread quickly. According to data from the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), yields have increased by 60 per cent since the implementation of large scale agricultural reforms, while other datasets point towards more modest gains. Yet, estimates in line with those of the FAO dominate the official discourse. We suggest that the discrepancies between datasets may be explained by the difficulties of collecting accurate agricultural statistics combined with an incentive to overestimate yields to show that the reforms have worked.  相似文献   
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Interdiction patrolling (also known as hot spots policing) is a proactive police operation that depends on good planning. And the pursuit of fleeing suspects is a challenging operation that all police forces engage in on a regular basis. We give software tools that improve the effectiveness of both. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our tools by applying them to the case of rhino poaching in wildlife reserves. An interdiction patrol pre-emptively seeks out poaching parties within a reserve. Upon picking up the trail of a poaching party, a pursuit team needs a pursuit strategy that optimizes their chances of an interception. Our interdiction patrol route tool identifies optimal interdiction patrol routes to walk. This tool is based on a Stackelberg game and represents different types of poachers and their utilities. These utilities are updated (learned) each time new information on poaching party routes is added to the database. Our second tool provides a real-time sequence of team member moves that maximizes the team’s chances of apprehending a pursued party. We show that our tools perform well when applied to simulated and real data.  相似文献   
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