The Political Economy of Facebook Advertising: Election Spending,Regulation and Targeting Online

Political advertising on Facebook is the latest in a long line of developments in campaign practice, and is a tool that has been mobilised extensively in elections around the world. In this article, we explore what we know about Facebook advertising at elections and ask what existing data from the UK Electoral Commission can reveal about current usage. Highlighting the principles behind Facebook advertising, we argue that existing metrics offer little insight into current campaign trends—posing analytical, methodological and normative challenges for academics and electoral regulators alike. Moreover, we argue that these challenges strike at the heart of debates about democratic responsibility and the degree to which governments should cede responsibility to commercial actors who may have differing understandings of fundamental democratic norms.     

The employment of finance in small business

Small‐scale businessmen everywhere, and particularly in developing countries, believe that their most pressing problem, if not their only one, is lack of finance. Organisations devoted to the promotion of small business have come to believe that finance must be accompanied by management advice. It is suggested that such advice should in fact precede any consideration of financial assistance; this will not only improve the chances of effective use of the additional finance, if it is eventually provided, but, more important still, it may show that there is in fact no need for more capital at all.     

Of Athenians and Spartans: Profiles of freedom and enlightenment in the leadership styles of criminal justice academic administrators: An essay

This essay examines the dubious relationship between the quality of criminal justice education and the kind of treatment faculty members and students receive from their academic administrators. It is based on three premises: criminal justice colleges and departments should be held to higher rational and moral standards not because they are qualitatively different from other liberal arts departments, but because they teach justice; if the virtues of criminal justice are worth teaching, then criminal justice faculty members and students should be treated in a manner consistent with these virtues; and treating criminal justice faculty members and students unfairly, disrespectfully, or irresponsibly makes them unable or disinterested in endorsing the noble nature of criminal justice. This article categorizes academic administrators as either Athenians or Spartans. The former are best suited intellectually and temperamentally to administer because they possess a talent for reasoning and act in good faith. The latter are unsuited because, regardless of how well they mask it, they practice domination, deception, favoritism, and indignity.This essay is a theoretical discourse based on the contiguity of modalities, experiences, and impressions generally shared by criminal justice educators and graduate students. Its logic is Humeian and its method is broadly ethnographic.     

The Dictator Game, Fairness and Ethnicity in Postwar Bosnia

This study considers the effects of ethnic violence on norms of fairness. Once violence is a foregone conclusion, will cooperative norms ever (re‐)emerge beyond ethnic boundaries? We use an experiment that measures how fairly individuals in a postconflict setting treat their own ingroup in comparison to the outgroups—in this case, examining the behavior of 681 Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in postwar Bosnia‐Herzegovina. To assess fairness, we use the dictator game wherein subjects decide how to allocate a sum of money between themselves and an anonymous counterpart of varying ethnicity. We find that the effects of ethnicity on decision making are captured by our experiments. Although results indicate preferential ingroup treatment, the incidence and magnitude of outgroup bias is much less than expected. We conclude that norms of fairness across ethnicity are remarkably strong in Bosnia, and we take this to be a positive sign for reconciliation after violent conflict.     

Exploring the Determinants of the Entry and Exit of Ministers in Korea: 1980–2008

The entry and exit of ministers has been of primary interest to students of political science and public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of research on the entry and exit of ministers in non‐Western countries, this article examined determinants of both the entrance and exit of ministers in Korea from the life cycle point of view based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. We argued that as the Korean presidency shifts from an imperialistic to a democratic presidency, ministerial appointments in Korea also seem to shift from an expertise‐focused to a politics‐focused approach. Likewise, the primary resignation reason also shifts from policy failure to political reasons. We also argued that Korean presidents use their power to reshuffle cabinet ministers too often for their political interests. As a result, Korean ministers spend too little time in post; average tenure is now down to about one year. These short terms in office dilute a minister's ability to dictate departmental policy.     

An Empirical Analysis on the Determinants of the Length of Ministerial Tenure in Korea, 1980–2008

ABSTRACT

The study of the length of ministerial tenure has received some attention by scholars of public management in Western countries. Responding to the lack of empirical research on ministerial duration in non-Western countries, this article empirically examines the determinants of ministerial duration based on the Korean Ministerial Database from 1980 to 2008. The empirical findings are as follows. First, being a female minister decreases the probability of stepping down by 1.78 times compared to a male minister. Second, political democratization after 1987 drastically increases the probability of ministerial stepping down by 3.46 times. Third, confirmation hearings after 2005 decrease the probability of ministerial stepping down by 0.53 times. Based on these empirical findings of the analysis, we can identify distinctive characteristics of ministerial duration in Korea. We argue that as the Korean political system shifts from military or authoritarian rule to democratic rule after 1987, a single five-year presidential term may set a political environment for frequent changes of ministers to allocate political spoils.