The ideological conditions for Khomeini's doctrine of government ∗

The Islamic movements and ideologies labelled ‘Fundamentalist’ share an oppositional stance to their respective governments rather than common doctrinal positions. The Islamisation of society and the state is planned on the model of the ‘original’ Islamic community of Muhammad and his immediate successors, but the interpretation of their principles in relation to modern socio-political contexts gives rise to political ideologies which represent marked departures from traditional Islamic doctrines and incorporate implicity or explicity modern political concepts. Khomeini's doctrine of government is an interesting example in that it is entirely based on traditional Shi'ite, premises and modes of reasoning and yet it reaches novel conclusions. It is argued that these conclusions presuppose the modern ideological notions of ‘the nation’ and the ‘nation-state’.     

The ‘Arab Spring’ in the historical perspectives of Middle East politics

Abstract

The events of the ‘Arab Spring’ appeared to be animated by slogans and objectives of universalist orientations to liberty, dignity and social justice, a departure from the ethno-religious nationalisms that dominated the politics of the region. They raised questions regarding the ‘exceptionalism’ of Arabs and Muslims, whom many observers and commentators considered to be tied to sentiments and solidarities of patrimonialism, tribe and religion. Yet, the forces that seemed to benefit from the transformations in Egypt and elsewhere were not those that made the ‘revolution’ but precisely religious and patriarchal parties which benefited from popular constituencies in elections. A consideration of the political history of the main countries concerned can throw some light on these transformations. The nationalist, often military, regimes which emerged from the independence struggles of mid-twentieth century headed ideological, populist, nationalist and ‘socialist’ movements and parties and authoritarian regimes which eliminated oppositional politics and social autonomies in favour of a corporatist welfare state. These regimes, facing economic and geo-political contingencies of the later decades were transformed into dynastic oligarchies and crony capitalism which broke the compact of welfare and subsidies leading to intensified impoverishment and repression of their populations. Popular strata were driven ever more into reliance on ‘survival units’ of kin and community, reinforcing communal and religious attachments at the expense of civic and associational life. These ties and sentiments come to the fore when the ruling dynasties are displaced, as in Iraq after the 2003 invasion or Egypt after the removal of Mubarak. The ideological and universalist politics of the revolutionaries appear to be swamped by those conservative affiliations.     

Police officer involved shootings – retrospective study of situational characteristics

Abstract

The study analyzed the situational characteristics of 112 incidents where police used firearms to handle high threat situations. Most shooting incidents emanated from usually uneventful tasks, e.g., handling burglaries or disturbances. The assailants were commonly armed with firearms (26%), sharp (27%) or blunt objects (10%). The incidents were regularly short-lasting (in 39% were shots fired ≤3 s from threat emerged) and occurred at short distances (in 42% at distances ≤3 m). Predominantly, the first responders had to address the situation and did so with warning shots or, equally common, with fire-for-effect shots (40%) or a combination thereof. Psychological stress was manifested as feelings of panic at some point and as motor skill alterations, e.g., firing without using sights and with one hand only. Analysis of these incidents shows that all field duty police officers should receive training in handling potentially life-threatening, sudden, close-range attacks.     

One Stop Shops for Public Services: Evidence from Citizen Service Centers in Brazil

Citizen Service Centers are government offices where different authorities are co-located and where several public services are offered in the same physical location. The goal of implementing such One Stop Shops for public services is to solve problems with a malfunctioning government bureaucracy for frontline service delivery. In spite of reforms in at least 70 countries, however, there are few evaluations. This paper evaluates the impact of Poupatempo (“Savetime”), a Brazilian Citizen Service Center reform that has inspired similar programs in other countries. We collect data on one of the most common errands at the Brazilian bureaucracy, driver's license renewal, and evaluate the impact of Poupatempo on the time, number of trips, and payments needed to undertake the renewal, and on other variables representing transaction costs, red tape, and transparency in the citizen-state interaction. Our difference-in-differences estimates indicate large reductions in the time expended by citizens and in proxies for transaction costs, but are less encouraging for the social quality of the licensing procedure, which we also evaluate. We discuss whether incentives to speed up processes prevailed where other steering instruments would have been more appropriate, and explore remedies. We also discuss limitations to establishing a true One Stop Shop.     

Syria's Forgotten First President Mohammad Ali al-Abed

The story of Syria's first president Mohammad Ali al-Abed is not told in Syrian history books, for a variety of reasons. One is the drama of Syrian history after 1936, when he stepped down. Another is the fact that he came to power with French blessing, making him an easy target for the National Bloc, which dominated Syrian public life from 1936 until 1958. When the Ba'athists came to power in 1963, they systematically excised entire sections of modern Syrian history; anything that came before the socialist revolution, they claimed, was capitalistic, imperialistic, elitist, backward, and ultimately wrong. Any praise of Abed, or his generation of Syrian nationalists, tended to result in harassment by the security services, or jail. As a result, four generations grew up in Ba'athist Syria knowing of no other president than Hafez al-Assad. This article tries to remedy this by shedding light on the career of a forgotten president from pre-Baath Syria.     

Public–Private Partnership (PPP) as an Interdependent Form (I-Form) Organization

As “public–private partnership” (PPP) is becoming a popular model among states, the debate concerning how to make it more successful is accelerating. Based on insights from contemporary organization theory (OT), the present article suggests that instead of taking PPP as “partnership” between private and public sector partners, it is rather more beneficial to construe it as inter-dependent form (I-Form) organization. Subsequently, it identifies three types of interdependencies, faced by PPP-based I-Form organizations, and furnishes a model—comprising of initial and external conditions, and interplay of internal factors—that could enable smooth functioning and performance of I-Form organization.     

Interfaith Dialogue and Faith-Based Social Activism in a State of Emergency: <Emphasis Type="Italic">laïcité</Emphasis> and the Crisis of Religion in France

A significant body of literature demonstrates that the discourse of laïcité has become steadily more politicised in recent years (Gidley and Renton 2017; Hajjat and Mohammed, 2016). A series of value-laden discursive constructs have come to be coupled with the normative rulings of secularism (Kahn 2007). This has led to an omerta around Islamophobia in the French political sphere. Based on 20 months (October 2015–May 2017) of ethnographic research in the tense context of Parisian civil society due to austerity and insecurity, this paper shows how interfaith initiatives and faith-based social action figure into a new landscape of state-enforced values under a state of emergency, where one religion in particular is under scrutiny. The first argument is that while interfaith education and outreach are dialogical vectors for combating discrimination, they are constrained by the discourse of laïcité and the implicit targeting of Muslims in the state of emergency (état d’urgence). Seldom explicit, the approach to dialogue between religions of many of these interfaith associations--voluntary organisations--lack a critique of laïcité and its epistemological correlation to anti-clericalism. By contrast, faith-based social action, and its inevitable multi-faith encounter, generates more personal understandings about discrimination. Therefore the second argument, is that it is through social action that the recognition of religious identity as a factor acting in favour of a shared secular-religious common good can come about.     

Sheikh Wahbah al-Zuhaili on international relations: the discourse of a prominent Islamist scholar (1932–2015)

In recent years, radical and violent Islamist movements – such as al-Qaeda and its offshoot the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria – have seized the spotlight. A corollary of this preoccupation has been the proliferation of studies on the political thought of radical Islamist figures such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Osama bin-Laden. By contrast, scant attention has been paid to the thought of moderate contemporary Sunni Islamist scholars. This article attempts to rectify this situation by focusing on the international relations discourse of a prominent Syrian Islamist thinker Sheikh Wahbah al-Zuhaili (hereafter Zuhaili). The article examines Zuhaili's views on three central and interrelated topics: (1) the nature and underpinning principles of international relations; (2) war; and (3) the role of international law and international norms and conventions in international relations. By shedding light on Zuhaili's thought and situating it in its proper ideational and historical contexts, the article concludes that radical Islamist ideology is at the periphery of contemporary Islamist conceptualizations of international relations while the epicentre is held by mainstream Islamists whose perspectives on international relations are fairly compatible with prevalent western views, especially those emanating from the Realist school.