A statistical model for Condorcet efficiency based on simulation under spatial model assumptions

This essay evaluates six single-winner, multicandidate electoral systems with respect to their tendency to choose Condorcet candidates. To this end I calibrate a logistic multiple regression model from Monte Carlo simulations, based on a multivariate normal spatial model, in which I vary the number of candidates, number of dimensions, correlation structure, and relative dispersion of candidates and voters. I investigate additional spatial-model variations by comparing further simulation results with predictions of the basic statistical model. The results suggest that for many electoral systems, Condorcet efficiency would increase with perceptual uncertainty of candidates' positions and would be low in a polarized society. Of the voting systems studied, approval voting and the Coombs systems appear least sensitive to variations in assumptions.     

LGBTQ Youth in the Child Welfare System: An Overview of Research,Practice, and Policy

LGBTQ youth are largely overrepresented in the child welfare system. The experiences of LGBTQ youth have largely been overlooked. LGBTQ youth often encounter a number of challenges and disparities as they navigate the child welfare system. Many report experiences of discrimination, marginalization, and an overall lack of acceptance. The permanency and placement options have historically been limited for many LGBTQ youth, often leading to an over reliance on congregate settings and aging out of foster are. The current article provides a synthesis of the existing research on the experiences and outcomes of LGBTQ youth in care, as well as an exploration of the policy and practice initiatives aimed at creating a more inclusive system of care.     

Understanding a Period of Policy Change: The Case of Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Policy in Colorado

This paper investigates the beliefs and framing strategies of interest groups during a period of policy change and the factors explaining policy change. We develop propositions to explore questions concerning policy change primarily from the advocacy coalition framework as well as from other theorie. The propositions are tested by examining the promulgation of a Colorado regulation requiring the disclosure of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing. Using coded data of documents published by organizations involved in the rulemaking process, we find divergence between industry and environmental groups on their beliefs concerning hydraulic fracturing, as well as their portraying themselves and each other as heroes, victims, and villains, but some convergence on their more specific beliefs concerning disclosure of chemicals. Interviews point to the importance of policy entrepreneurs, timing, a negotiated agreement, and learning for explaining policy change. The findings provide both theoretical and methodological insights into how and why policy changes.     

Candidates’ policy strategies in primary elections: does strategic voting by the primary electorate matter?

Empirical research reports conflicting conclusions about whether primary election voters strategically account for candidates’ general election prospects when casting their votes. We model the strategic calculations of office-seeking candidates facing two-stage elections beginning with a primary, and we compare candidates’ policy strategies in situations where primary voters strategically support the most viable general election candidate against candidate strategies when voters expressively support their preferred primary candidate regardless of electability. Our analyses—in which the candidates’ appeal is based on their policy positions and their campaigning skills—suggest a surprising conclusion: namely, that strategic and expressive primary voting typically support identical equilibrium configurations in candidate strategies. Our conclusions are relevant to candidates facing contested primaries, and also to political parties facing the strategic decision about whether or not to use primary elections to select their candidates—a common dilemma for Latin American (and some European) parties.     

Modeling the effects of changing issue salience in two-party competition

For a given distribution of voter ideal points, candidates may compete, not only by changing their policy platforms, but also by seeking to persuade voters to place more weight on one of the given dimensions. We do not examine persuasion mechanisms, per se, but, rather, investigate how change of the salience weights can lead to alternation of majorities for the candidates, even though candidate positions remain fixed. Thus, competition over the salience of issue dimensions can, under certain circumstances, be crucial for determining election outcomes. We illustrate potential non-monotonicities in priming effects in terms of the Fourier series decomposition of the distribution of voter preferences, showing that the existence of higher-level harmonics leads to greater uncertainty about election outcomes and about best heresthetic strategies. We then demonstrate the empirical relevance of our results with data on two issue dimensions of political competition in the 2000 U.S. presidential election.