Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence Voting in the UN General Assembly?

Recent studies report that temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, the World Bank, or in US foreign aid in exchange for their political support for permanent members. Nevertheless, few studies have examined whether this favorable treatment and these benefits have actually made any significant changes in the member states’ voting behavior in the United Nations. To explore this question, we investigate whether membership on the UN Security Council influences a state’s voting in the UN General Assembly. In the analysis of panel data for 197 countries over the period from 1946 to 2008, the empirical results show that elected members of the UN Security Council tend to behave similarly with permanent members, especially with the United States, as the number of loan programs signed with the IMF and the World Bank increases. Also, US foreign aid significantly increases temporary members’ vote coincidence with the United States and other permanent members. In this regard, this article contributes to our understanding of state voting behavior and power politics in international organizations.     

A Rigorous Quasi‐Experimental Design to Evaluate the Causal Effect of a Mandatory Divorce Education Program

All couples with minor children who filed for divorce within a specific 6‐week period (N = 191 couples) in one jurisdiction were ordered to attend a divorce education program. The control group included about 20 couples randomly selected from each of six 6‐week intervals before and six 6‐week intervals after the treatment interval (N = 243 couples). Archival records were searched for variables such as legal and residential custody award, visitation percentage, and relitigation. The impact of the program was assessed by evaluating, for each variable, whether the data for program interval departed from the straight (regression) line drawn through all the control group intervals. Only the visitation time award significantly differed: 27.75% for treatment couples and 22.46% for control couples. Analyses show that the father's attendance at the program primarily accounts for the difference.

Key Points for the Family Court Community
• There are considerable methodological weaknesses in most of the existing evaluations of divorcing parent education programs.
• Stronger, more scientifically rigorous—and thus persuasive—designs are possible in court settings, such as the regression discontinuity quasi‐experimental design we feature here.
• Archival records, such as various court filings, are a rich and relatively untapped source of data.
• Being mandated to attend a single 2‐hour divorcing parent education class caused an increase in the visitation time award in divorce decrees.
• There is a disconnect between being mandated by a judge to attend a program and actual attendance.

     

EFFECTS OF FATHER AND MOTHER PARENTING ON CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH IN HIGH‐ AND LOW‐CONFLICT DIVORCES

This article studied the relations of children's mental health problems to the warmth of their relationship with their noncustodial father and custodial mother and the level of conflict between the parents. Using a sample of 182 divorcing families, multiple regression was used to test the independent effect of father warmth, mother warmth, and interparental conflict. Results indicated that father warmth and mother warmth were both independently related to lower child‐externalizing problems. However, the relations between mother and child warmth and child‐internalizing problems were different as a function of interparental conflict and level of warmth with the other parent. Implications for court practices and policies are discussed.     

Quantitative Leverage Through Qualitative Knowledge: Augmenting the Statistical Analysis of Complex Causes

Social scientific theories frequently posit that multiple causalmechanisms may produce the same outcome. Unfortunately, it isnot always possible to observe which mechanism was responsible.For example, IMF scholars conjecture that nations enter IMFagreements both out of economic need and for discretionary domesticpolitical reasons. Typically, though, all we observe is thefact of agreement, not its cause. Partial observability probitmodels (Poirier 1980, Journal of Econometrics 12:209–217; Braumoeller2003, Political Analysis 11:209–233) provide one methodfor the statistical analysis of such phenomena. Unfortunately,they are often plagued by identification and labeling difficulties.Sometimes, however, qualitative studies of particular casesenlighten us about causes when quantitative studies cannot.We propose exploiting this information to lend additional structureto the partial observability approach. Monte Carlo simulationreveals that by anchoring "discernible" causes for a handfulof cases about which we possess qualitative information, weobtain greater efficiency. More important, our method provesreliable at recovering unbiased parameter estimates when thepartial observability model fails. The paper concludes withan analysis of the determinants of IMF agreements.

A member shall be entitled to purchase the currencies of othermembers from the Fund ...[provided] the member represents thatit has a need to make the purchase because of its balance ofpayments or its reserve position or developments in its reserves. —InternationalMonetary Fund Articles of Agreement [IMF] negotiations sometimesenable government leaders to do what they privately wish todo, but are powerless to do domestically. —Robert Putnam(1988, p. 457)

     

The State of American Federalism, 1995-1996

Federalism was a major political issue in 1995 and 1996 withpresidential candidates, congressional leaders, governors, andthe courts weighing in with proposals to shift responsibilityfrom Washington to states and localities. There was more talkthan action, but as the second session of the 104th Congresswound down in the late summer, a major proposal to block grantthe 61-year old Aid to Families with Dependent Children programwas enacted. This enactment allowed both Democrats and Republicansto take political credit, and gave major responsibilities tothe states to implement the new approach to a former entitlementprogram. Five themes characterized the year: (1) federalismwas once again a salient issue; (2) deficit reduction and devolutionwere bound together; (3) the U.S. Supreme Court continued toreexamine and possibly redefine the legal parameters of federalism;(4) state officials became more visible political actors inWashington, D. C.; and (5) states provided key policy and managementleadership.     

Conflict resolution: benchmarking water utility performance

The water sector has economic and symbolic importance for citizens in developing countries. Water utility benchmarking is no panacea for improving water sector performance. Nevertheless, it can contribute to addressing four sources of conflict in the design and implementation of policies: cognitive conflicts (based on technical disagreements regarding how data might be analysed and interpreted), interest conflicts (where suppliers and demanders obtain different benefits and costs under alternative policies), values conflicts (involving ideology or personal preferences regarding water sector outcomes) and authority conflicts (stemming from jurisdictional disagreements over who has the last word). These potential sources of conflict characterise most politically‐charged situations, including water supply management. This article examines the extent to which water utility benchmarking facilitates conflict resolution. Without information on historical trends, current baselines and realistic targets, conflicts over reforms to improve sector performance can weaken systems that are already fragile, particularly those in developing countries. This article attempts to improve our understanding of the links between sources of conflict, government approaches for dealing with conflict and the role of water utility benchmarking as a complementary strategy for addressing policy issues. Benchmarking is one way regulators and managers can promote conflict resolution that allows participants to focus on performance. The principles apply to all sectors with significant state oversight. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Decline of the Legislative Veto: Federal/State Comparisons and Interactions

Legislative veto systems originated in the 1930s. Their numberincreased steadily until the early 1980s and then declined significantly.The decline of the legislative veto is attributable primarilyto decisions by a number of state supreme courts between 1980and 1984, and by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1983. Almost allcourt decisions have held the legislative veto to be an unconstitutionalviolation of the separation of powers. In addition, most proposalsto authorize the legislative veto by state constitutional amendmenthave been rejected by voters. There has also been a decreasein legislators' enthusiasm for the legislative veto, even instates where it has not been declared unconstitutional. Legislatorshave found other ways to control administrative agencies. Inexamining the decline of the legislative veto, one finds thatthe federal government exercised little influence over the states,the states exercised still less influence over the federal government,but the states did significantly influence one another.