J. Covarubbias and T. Lansford (Eds.), Strategic Interests and the Middle East: Opposition or Support for U.S. Foreign Policy

ABSTRACT

The United States was at least partly culpable for the failure of denuclearisation agreements with North Korea concluded during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush in the 1990s and early 2000s. American failure to implement commitments in a timely manner arose from a combination of domestic and presidential politics, the constraints imposed by international partnerships, and bureaucratic structures and procedures. For its part, North Korea implemented its commitments faithfully until its leadership’s increasing disenchantment with American tardiness and perceived lack of good faith.     

Regional push: Towards a geography of development and growth in lowand middle-income countries

Regional push derives from the geographic agglomeration of economic activities, and is expressed in increments to national productivity. Various pieces of statistical evidence in favour of the existence of regional push effects in low- and middle-income economies are marshalled. The origins of these effects in different sorts of externalities and increasing returns to agglomerative scale and scope are analysed in theoretical terms. Further evidence for the existence of these effects is displayed in a brief review of published case studies of African, Asian, and Latin American regions. A number of observations are then offered on the possibilities of identifying viable developmental policies and practices directed to enhancing the productivity-boosting properties of regions in low- and middle-income economies.     

Discourse and strategic continuity from Gorbachev through Putin

Discourse analysis reveals that Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary and his successors as Russian presidents have practiced a shared strategy of metaphorical – not spatial – centrism that has gradually slid the state from dictatorship toward democracy. Preservation of a political center for himself and his successors to occupy made it necessary for Boris Yeltsin to dismantle the USSR if elections in Russia were to continue. At the same time, for each successive exponent of this centrist strategy, an attempt to practice democracy without the repellent flaws of electoral fraud and political repression would forgo the strategic advantage of occupying the political center.     

THE CIA'S SECRET POWERS

The secret powers conferred by the National Security Act of 1947 have been used over the years to train, arms, and develop the terrorist enemies, such as al-Qaida, that are now the chief justification for those powers in the public mind. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, CIA programs have shifted power from moderate to Islamist Muslim groups, contributed to vastly increased heroin production in the area, and helped consolidate the ISI as Pakistan's drug-financed intelligence agency a “state within a state” that has promoted both al-Qaida and terrorism in other areas such as Kashmir. The secret powers, by preventing rational discussion, have spawned disastrous policy decisions that even the CIA itself has opposed, notably the decision to supply Stingers to the Afghan rebels. The most conspicuous deep political consequence of these policies in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been the indirect training and arming of cadres who eventually participated in the specific events of 9/11: the culmination of a series of terrorist attacks against the territorial United States for which the CIA itself had already, in 1998, secretly admitted partial responsibility. This responsibility is reflected in the present inability of the U.S. government and media to report honestly on what actually happened in the 9/11 attacks.     

Withdrawal symptoms: Social and cultural aspects of the October 6 coup

Abstract

Extract

In themselves, military coups are nothing new in modern (or ancient) Thai history. There have been at least eight successful, and many more unsuccessful, coups since the one that overthrew the absolute monarchy in 1932. It is therefore not altogether surprising that some Western journalists and academics have depicted the events of October 6 1976 as “typical” of Thai politics, and even as a certain “return to normalcy” after three years of unsuitable flirtation with democracy. In fact, however, October 6 marks a clear turning point in Thai history for at least two quite different reasons. First, most of the important leaders of the legal left-wing opposition of 1973–1976, rather than languishing in jail or in exile like their historical predecessors, have joined the increasingly bold and successful maquis. Second, the coup was not a sudden intra-elite coup de main, but rather was the culmination of a two-year-long right-wing campaign of public intimidation, assault and assassination best symbolized by the orchestrated mob violence of October 6 itself.