Government Selection and Executive Powers: Constitutional Design in Parliamentary Democracies

Provisions for a parliamentary investiture vote have become increasingly common in parliamentary democracies. This article shows that investiture provisions were largely introduced when new constitutions were written or old ones fundamentally redesigned. It also shows that the constitutions that endowed executives with strong legislative agenda powers also endowed parliaments with strong mechanisms to select the executive. It is argued that constitution makers’ decisions can be seen in principal–agent terms: strong investiture rules constitute an ex ante mechanism of parliamentary control – that is, a mechanism to minimise adverse selection and reduce the risk of agency loss by parliament. The findings have two broad implications: from a constitutional point of view, parliamentary systems do not rely exclusively on ex post control mechanisms such as the no confidence vote to minimise agency loss; parliamentarism, at least today and as much as presidentialism, is the product of conscious constitutional design and not evolutionary adaptation.     

New South Wales

New South Wales easily retained its reputation as the State of commotion. Politicians and administrators during the past twelve months have lived through interesting times. Things are out in the open, at least. A rich and varied range of inquiries has been tackling problems which have remained hidden for decades. Hard items on the agenda of administrative reform are at last receiving attention. Courts and parliamentary procedures are being revitalized. The next great uproar will occur when the long-awaited Freedom of Information Act arrives and provides ordinary members of the public with their own tickets of admission to the political and administrative arena.     

Drug policies: A study of the opinions of local law enforcement patrol officers about various policy alternatives

The article briefly reviews some literature describing the scope and seriousness of psychoactive substance misuse in the United States and then examines some chronic problems in the nature of public policy analysis. A methodology. Conceptual Review, is briefly discussed as a plausible alternative to contemporary approaches. Data from n=100 patrol officers who completed the Drug Policy Questionnaire (DPQ) are presented. Patrol officers were highly supportive of conventional policies, e.g., prevention, education, and treatment, but also recommended more punitive approaches, e.g., imprisonment for both dealers and users. Legalization was rejected as a viable policy alternative. Implications for policy and future research are also discussed.