Principal-Agency Theory in Illegal Markets: Cooperation and Conflict Among Chinese Loansharks

There are management and organizational problems common to both legal and illegal businesses, such as moving one party to act in the interest of another rather than his own. In principal-agency theory, the party that wants someone else to do a job on his behalf is called the “principal” and the other party is called the “agent”. Principal-agency theory tries to find solutions to real and potential conflicts that arise from such transactional arrangements. We believe principal-agency theory has great potentials for understanding the operation and interpersonal relationships of criminal enterprises, in addition to the structural arrangements (e.g., a disorganized crime market) and the social network perspectives. Using a case study of Chinese loan sharking and cannabis cultivation in the Netherlands, we seek to make a theoretical contribution to existing literature on organized crime by focusing on how different individuals within a criminal enterprise negotiate the most efficient transactional arrangement in a principal-agent relationship amidst the uncertainties of an illicit market environment. We specifically look at four phases of the criminal enterprise studied: the selection of agents by the principal, attempts to bind these agents to the principal, potential conflicts and finally the solution of any problems. Incidentally, our study also gives insight in the less well-researched topic of loansharking.     

Surface-Transportation Funding in a New Century: Assessing One Slice of the Federal Marble Cake

This article examines American federalism through the prismof the surface transportation program, one of the nation's largestgrant-in-aid programs. No matter how pragmatic or intense thedesire to express assessments in simple terms, federalism isa time-sensitive reflection of our collective experiential understanding.Facts, values, hypotheses, and concepts are derived from thiscollective understanding. The experience of the surface transportationprogram under ISTEA and TEA–21 illustrates the challengeof achieving a clear picture of federalism when radical changesoccur. ISTEA and TEA–21 have significantly altered traditionalintergovernmental relationships, particularly as the federalrole in transportation appears to have become more ambiguousthan at any time in the past 45 years. Thus, at the outset ofthe twenty-first century, the federal role in transportationis shifting, becoming far less focused. Other goals are emerging,leading the federal transportation role to become more of ameans to an end than the central focal point.