Social Justice and Moral Reasoning: An Empirical Integration of Two Paradigms in Psychological Research

Distributive and procedural justice are of central importance to past and current theories of the psychology of moral development and the social psychology of justice. In order to explicate the relationships among theories, participants responded to both a measure of moral reasoning and a measure of 15 various justice criteria. Analyses showed that each schema of moral reasoning was significantly predicted by different concerns about social justice. Furthermore, individuals' judgments about justice were best represented by four factors, offering a broader definition of justice in relation to moral schemas. The findings were consistent with Kohlbergian theory; moral reasoning appears to proceed from concerns about self-interest to distributive fairness to procedural justice.     

Toleration without Liberal Foundations

The author's aim is to find principles grounding and limiting toleration that are sufficiently sensitive to the variety of distinct settings in which concrete problems arise, and to produce principles which can appeal both to liberals and to non-liberals. The range of settings is covered by fixing the nature of three distinct species of the genus right to toleration. Once these rights are analysed, an attempt is made to see what agreement about them can be reached by liberals and non-liberals if they have a common commitment to democracy. A definition of democracy is produced that, it is argued, liberals and non-liberals would have difficulty rejecting. It is then explored as a definition that has definite consequences over the three rights to toleration, putting the opponents before a choice: either to accept their preferred content for the right to toleration, or to support a democratic policy.