Ambiguous political power and contest efforts

When there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest, the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power, only one of which determines the contests’ winning probabilities. Our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants’ aggregate effort in a symmetric, simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power. Specifically, we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants’ private signals (i.e., the probability that a signal is correct) and the degree of correlation between them. Our benchmark case is the standard Tullock’s model, in which the source of power is known, i.e., the contestants’ signals are perfectly informative. We show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative. However, in any intermediate case the contestants’ aggregate effort is lower, provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated. In other words, there is a U-shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest. The lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0.85. In this case, efforts are reduced by about one-fifth in comparison with the benchmark case: from a rent dissipation of 50% to slightly over 40%.     

Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests

Using a public-policy application ofTullock's two-player rent-seeking contest,this paper focuses on the relationshipbetween the aggregate expected utility ofthe players and their asymmetricvaluations. In our game these valuationsare the players' payoffs in the twopossible states of nature, namely, theapproval and rejection of the proposedpublic policy. Our main result provides thecondition that ensures that the aggregateexpected payoff of the two contestants (theinterest groups that compete on theapproval of the proposed policy) is positively related to the valuationparameters.     

“Bending” Evidence for a Cause: Scholar‐Advocacy Bias in Family Law

There are a number of salient public policy issues in the family law field that have invoked impassioned policy debates on a recurrent basis. In the absence of a body of research to address these critical concerns, advocates under the guise of social science scholarship have exacerbated the confusion and controversy by construing the scant available research evidence to justify their own ends, without regard to the relevance, quality, utility, and limitations of the studies. This is one of two articles on this problem that we have named “scholar‐advocacy bias.” In this article, we discuss the difference between truth in social science and truth in law. We identify common ways in which social science researchers and reviewers of research—wittingly or unwittingly—can become advocates for ideological positions and social policies at the expense of being balanced reporters of research evidence as illustrated by recent debates about overnight parenting of infants and toddlers. We also consider how adherence to established scientific principles and methods prevents the misuse of research in this way.     

Investment Criteria in Single and Multi-Member Economic Organizations

This paper compares the determination of investment criteriain single- and multi-member organizations. Individualdecisional skills are assumed to be endogenous variables thatdepend on the investment criteria. Our main result specifiesthe condition that determines the relationship between theinvestment criteria in single- and multi-member organizations,given the size of the multi-member organization, the decisionrule it applies and the function relating the individual'sdecisional skills to the investment criterion. Theimplications of our main result are developed for specialorganizations such as hierarchies and polyarchies. Ouranalysis implies that the criteria in a multi-memberorganization may be stricter than the criteria set in asingle-member organization, even though in the former case theorganization may worsen the average decision-making ability ofits members. The analysis can be applied not only in singleand multi-member decision making settings, but also in somecontexts of centralized and decentralized decisions. This isillustrated in the case of decisions by editors ofprofessional journals regarding the acceptance or rejection ofsubmitted papers.     

FAMILY COURT–UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIP TO BENEFIT DIVORCING FAMILIES: THE EXPERIENCE OF MARICOPA COUNTY (ARIZONA) FAMILY COURT DEPARTMENT AND ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY'S PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER*

Using evidence‐based methods to help divorcing families requires the combined best efforts of legal professionals, courts, judges and administrators, mental health oriented service providers, and university researchers. Collaborative program development, implementation, and evaluation involve a complicated process of negotiation between professionals, yet this process is hardly ever described. The current article describes the processes we underwent in forging an alliance of researchers from Arizona State University's Prevention Research Center with professionals from the Maricopa County (Arizona) Family Court, a collaboration that involved a true dialogue and cooperation from the earliest stages and continuing throughout the project. A Community‐Based Participatory Research model was the underlying basis for our partnership; its lynchpin device was a Joint Planning Committee.     

Foreign aid and terrorist groups: incidents,ideology, and survival

Public Choice - During recent decades, terrorist groups have sought refuge in weak or failed states from which to launch their attacks. Foreign aid to states harboring those groups may or may not...     

Efforts in two-sided contests

The degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two-sided contests that involve two types of efforts. While usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize, potential recipients of the rent-seeking efforts also participate in the contest. This is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent-seeking efforts by trying to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize. We show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation.