Bureaucrats–Enterprise Negotiation in China's Enterprise Reform at the Local Level: case studies in Guangzhou

This article explores the implementation of SOE reform in China at the local level, using case studies in Guangzhou as illustration. It is argued that local government spearheads a reform agenda that puts locally-defined state objectives first, not necessarily favouring enterprise restructuring. A full-fledged negotiation model does not exist in SOE reforms because all enterprises are controlled by the state and have to comply with top-down policies and orders. Government-enterprise relations and the degree of entrepreneurial power depend largely on the economic strength of the enterprise, with the boomers getting a good economic bargain while the laggards fail to gain sympathy from government. Enterprise workers are largely at the mercy of restructuring decisions that come from bargaining and at times collusion between managers and local bureaucrats.     

Harvard

Abstract

The following position paper was presented by a five-man delegation from the Harvard CCAS chapter to the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Paris on February 20, 1969. The group included Thomas Engelhardt, Cheryl Goodman, and Jon Livingston, all graduate students at Harvard, Neale Hunter, an Australian who spent 1965–67 teaching English in Shanghai, and Jonathan Mirsky, Director of Dartmouth's East Asia Center, who was unable to go to Paris but helped compose the statement.