Introduction: Ideology,Propaganda, and Political Discourse in the Xi Jinping Era

The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012–2017), the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such as the “New Normal”), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial topics (such as “eco-civilization”), intensified and diversified its argumentation patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-innovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule.     

Whose New Normal? Framing the Economic Slowdown Under Xi Jinping

After decades of double-digit economic growth, China experienced a significant drop in GDP growth rates in the wake of the global financial crisis. For the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping, who had assumed power in the fall of 2012, analysts predicted a looming crisis due to the alleged decline in the regime’s performance legitimacy. This article argues against a mechanistic application of the notion of performance legitimacy. Instead, it proposes to take into account the role of ideology in mediating public perceptions of regime performance. By tracking the career of the concept of “new normal” in Chinese public discourse over a period of three years – from late 2013 to late 2016 – it shows how the economic slowdown has been framed in ways conducive to the reproduction of regime legitimacy. The findings suggest an intense process of ideological contestation and decontestation, in which the domestic reflection of foreign audiences and their recognition of the Chinese regime’s performance have gained in importance.     

The Effects of Family Contact on Community Reentry Plans Among Incarcerated Youths

Research shows protective factors that mitigate risks for juvenile delinquency can also support the community reentry of incarcerated youths and deter future offending. Family engagement, educational attainment, and secure employment are widely accepted as important protective factors to prevent problematic behavior. Studies suggest these same protective factors are crucial for incarcerated youths and should be an integral part of reentry planning to improve post-release outcomes. Nevertheless, limited research exists on the association between these factors and the value of family involvement in reentry planning for incarcerated youths. This study addresses this gap by examining how increased family contact affects the likelihood of instituting education and employment reentry plans among youths in custody. Data were obtained from the Survey of Youth in Residential Placement (SYRP) that provides information on juvenile offenders in confinement. The SYRP is the first nationally representative cross-sectional survey to gather information directly from youths 10–20 years old in custody (N=7,073). Analyses were conducted using a sequence of regression models to test the relationship between the frequency of family contact and whether a youth had a plan for education or employment upon release. Results reflect that youths with increased family contact were one and a half times more likely to have both educational and employment reentry plans in place relative to youths with no family contact. Findings inform practice and policy to advocate for family involvement with youth in confinement, and further suggest that family plays a decisive role in preparing incarcerated youths for success upon release.     

37 years with Keith T. Poole

This piece contains slightly revised remarks made at the conference honoring Keith T. Poole held at the University of Georgia in May, 2017. Poole’s major contributions are summarized.     

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

In the classic Hotelling–Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.