J.M. Keynes and the Personal Politics of Reparations: Part 2

The second part of this article shows that John Maynard Keynes worked closely with the German Finance and Foreign ministries as a supposed neutral expert in October 1922. He supported passive resistance to the French in the Ruhr without regard to its effects on the currency, secretly collaborated in writing the German reparations note of June 1923, and then praised his own work in a weekly that he controlled. Keynes opposed the 1929 Young Plan that re-scheduled the German debt and declined to accept modern thinking on overcoming the transfer problem.     

The European union as a diplomatic actor: internal,traditional, and structural diplomacy

An investigation into EU diplomacy naturally requires an analysis of the diplomacy developed within the framework of the Common Foreign and Securiry Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU). But equally important is the ‘internal diplomacy’ focusing on the settlement of mutual relationships among member states and particularly the ‘structural diplomacy’ based on EU strategies and partnerships with other regions in the world, which is aimed at promoting structural long-term changes in these regions.     

Process Matters: Conflict and Cooperation in Sequential Government-Dissident Interactions

Competing hypotheses on the relationship between government and dissident behavior emerge from both formal and empirical models. Yet, the current literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical account of such contradictory effects. This study develops a theory to account for a large number of competing hypotheses within a single framework. The theory explains various government and dissident tactical choices over the course of an internal political struggle by focusing on leaders, their motivations, and the link between their motivations and actions. The theory gives rise to a process model of sequential government-dissident interactions that is used to test several implied hypotheses. Empirical sequential time-series models of government and dissident behavior find support for most of the theory's implied hypotheses in Israel (1979–2002) and Afghanistan (1990–99).     

Information warfare and nuclear conflict termination

This study considers the possible implications of information warfare for efforts to terminate a nuclear war, or a war between nuclear armed states that is about to go nuclear. Information warfare could interfere with some of the requirements for nuclear conflict termination in at least five ways: by increasing the difficulty of accurate communication between heads of state; by decreasing the likelihood of military compliance with terms of ceasefire or settlement; by reinforcing mass images of the enemy that make it more difficult for leaders to negotiate; and by making battle damage assessment more complicated; and by increasing the amount of uncertainty within an already chaotic government decision‐making process and within a possibly acephalous military instrument.