Reappraising Institutional Contributions to the Efficiency of Environmental Policy

Books reviewed in this article:
Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Environmental Choices: Policy Responses to Green Demands
David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law     

Issues,the Spatial Theory of Voting,and British General Elections: A Comparison of Proximity and Directional Models

Competing spatial models of voter choiceare compared in the context ofparliamentary representatives selectedthrough single-member district, pluralityelections where party platforms areemphasized over individual candidates.Respondents of the 1987, 1992, and 1997British general election surveys ratepolitical parties on a series of issuescales. Ordered logistic regressions ofparty evaluations under proximity,directional, and mixed models reveal thatthe classic spatial model and thedirectional model perform equally well.Differences center on perceptions of thestatus quo, as voters appear to evaluatethe incumbent party (here, theConservatives) slightly differently thanminority parties (Labour and the LiberalDemocrats). The proximity model worksbetter for voter evaluations of governingparties while the directional model workswell for opposition parties.     

Groups,Growth and Trust: Cross-Country Evidence on the Olson and Putnam Hypotheses

Olson (1982) and Putnam (1993) providesharply conflicting perspectives on theimpact of private associations on economicwell-being and social conflict. Olson(1982) emphasized their propensity to actas special interest groups that lobby forpreferential policies, imposingdisproportionate costs on the rest ofsociety. Putnam (1993) viewed membershipsin horizontal associations as a source ofgeneralized trust and social ties conduciveto governmental efficiency and economicperformance. Using cross-country data,this paper investigates the impact ofassociational memberships on generalizedtrust and economic performance, findinglittle support for Olson's view of theimpact of groups, and only mixed supportfor the Putnam perspective.     

'Appropriate' Policy Knowledge, and Institutional and Governance Implications

The papers in this special section of AJPA are the product of a symposium held in Brisbane in February 2003, which was jointly sponsored by the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland and the Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet. Three papers were delivered. David Adams, from the Victorian Public Service, delivered a paper entitled 'Usable knowledge and public policy'. Wayne Parsons, from the University of London, gave a paper 'Not just steering but weaving: Relevant knowledge and the craft of building policy capacity'. Randal Stewart, a policy consultant based in Sydney, gave a paper entitled 'Public sector reform knowledge production'. The purposes of this paper are to highlight salient points from the papers and to assess briefly the institutional and governance implications of taking at last some steps beyond the currently prevailing rationalist approaches to policy and governance.     

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contracting approach to centralbanking in a simple common agency model. We suggest thatcentral banker contracts that do not consider the possibilityof more than one principal existing are incomplete contracts.Such incomplete contracts can be a poor form ofmonetary policy delegation under common agency. We develop amodel with two principals – society (government) and ageneric interest group, whose objective conflicts withsociety’s ex ante preferences by incorporating an inflationarybias. We determine when the government-offered orinterest-group-offered contract dominates the central banker’sdecision. The results largely depend on whether theinterest-group-offered contract is written in terms of outputor inflation.     

Demokratie, Autokratie und die regulative Gestaltung der Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen in Entwicklungsländern

This paper investigates into the political determinants of trade policy regulation in developing countries. When choosing between the trade policy instruments tariffs and quota governments consider the effects of these policies on their political support from interest groups and voters. It is argued that quantitative restrictions become increasingly less attractive as a country democratizes. Instead, motives of revenue generation gain importance. Therefore, the likelihood of democratic governments choosing quota is smaller than for their autocratic counterparts. Empirical tests based on a sample of 75 developing countries for the years 1979–1998 support the hypothesis.     

Editorial

Ohne Zusammenfassung

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Editorial