Analyzing factors influencing readmission to a battered women's shelter

Factors that distinguished first admission and readmission to an emergency woman's shelter were examined using discriminant function analysis. Records from 563 women who were residents were analyzed. Results suggest that source of income, number and developmental stage of children, and prior history of physical assault are precursors of readmissions. This study was discussed in terms of improving follow-up services to former residents of emergency shelters.     

Institutional Change,Party Discipline,and the House Democratic Caucus, 1911–19

Abstract The House Democratic Caucus of 1911 to 1919 is a largely understudied institution in the literature on congressional party government, despite the claims of many scholars that the caucus functioned as a significant instrument of party government by binding legislators' floor votes. An analysis of roll‐call votes, new data from the caucus journal, and contemporary accounts from the period indicate that these claims are largely exaggerated, although the caucus did, on occasion, improve floor discipline within the party. I find that intraparty homogeneity on crosscutting issues was related to caucus success. In addition, I argue that the adoption and use of the binding caucus can best be understood from the “multiple goals” viewpoint of congressional politics. These findings have important implications for understanding the development of party‐based institutions in Congress.     

Insurance Rationing versus Public Political Rationing: The Case of the Oregon Health Plan

This article describes the development and evolution of the Oregon experiment with public political rationing in health care. As dissatisfaction with current health care rationing has mounted, the search has accelerated for alternatives to replace the de facto rationing generated by the private health insurance marketplace. As the foremost example of public rationing, the closely-watched Oregon Health Plan is widely offered as an alternative to traditional private health insurance. Other health care rationing alternatives include health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and proposals that encourage self-rationing by individual consumers.     

The Special Case of Pesticides: Science and Regulation

Pesticide regulation is a data-intensive activity that is strongly controlled at the federal level. The pesticide law FIFRA controls pesticide sale, use, and disposal. Normal use of pesticides is excluded under RCRA and CERCLA. There are approximately 1,000 pesticide active ingredients with highly diverse functions ranging from insecticides to disinfectants and pheromones (insect sex attractants). There is a relatively large database on many pesticides, which helps reduce uncertainty in risk assessments. Witnesses subject to Daubert should be familiar with the data as well as the computer models designed for pesticides. “Inert” ingredients that are formulated with the pesticide active ingredients can become issues in torts cases. Federal courts have ruled both in favor and against FIFRA preemption, i.e., the ability of a plaintiff to seek relief in a torts case may be blocked by FIFRA. Golf course permitting provides a special land use whereby fundamental pesticide risk and regulatory issues are debated at the level of local planning and zoning commissions.     

Courtroom Applications of Virtual Environments, Immersive Virtual Environments, and Collaborative Virtual Environments

This article examines the possibilities and implications of employing virtual environments (VEs), immersive virtual environments (IVEs), and collaborative virtual environments (CVEs) in the courtroom. We argue that the immersive and interactive reality created by these tools adds significant value as a simulation of experience to enhance courtroom practice. The obvious boundaries between real and virtual enhance the attractiveness of these tools as technologies of rhetorical persuasion that can be used to demonstrate subjective perspective, strengthen or impeach the credibility of witnesses, and provide the trier of fact with a better understanding of each side's perception of the facts at issue. The article introduces the concepts of VEs, IVEs, and CVEs, describes the manners in which these technologies have been applied to settings other than the courts system, and review the relevant psychological and legal literature. It discusses specific applications of the technology to the court system and suggests how it could improve upon current procedures. Finally, it discusses some of the limitations and problems, and suggests legal reforms necessary to the adoption of these technologies, specifically rules of procedure that provide for all parties to be able to access, manipulate and inspect any virtual environment, the trier of fact to be able to interact with, rather than just accept the lawyer's rendition, and rules that provide for the parties to introduce at trial an inventory of all digital assets contained in the virtual environment, making those that are stipulated to and those that are in controversy.     

Making Hay with Actualism? The Need for a Realist Concept of Structure

This article criticises the ontological assumptions outlined in Colin Hay's recent book Political Analysis (2002). It takes issue with Hay's interpretation of critical realism, in particular his reading of the work of Margaret Archer. Furthermore, it is suggested that Hay's understanding of the structure-agency relationship contains weaknesses which have implications for both his theoretical and empirically-based work. It is argued that a more robust concept of social structure may be required to support the kind of critical political analysis Hay aspires to.     

Voting competitions with interested politicians: Platforms do not converge to the preferences of the median voter

We examine equilibrium voting strategies for elections with interested politicians facing uncertainty about voter pReferences. If politicians' utilities are defined over the set of strategies that voters select (instead of being dependent only on the probability of winning an election), equilibrium strategies will diverge (instead of converging to the median voter's pReferences) as long as politicians have different pReferences. We present conditions (i) for political compromise, and (ii) for politicians with different utility functions to merge into parties with complete strategic agreement.