Reviews

Hillel Ticktin, Origins of the Crisis in the USSR. Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1992. ix + 192 pp., $45.00 h/b, $19.95 p/b. Walter D. Connor, The Accidental Proletariat: Workers, Politics, and Crisis in Gorbachev's Russia. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991, xvi + 375 pp., £25.00. $39.50.

Archie Brown, ed., New Thinking in Soviet Politics. London: Macmillan, 1992, xii + 115 pp., £30.00 h/b, £9.99 p/b.

Vadim Bakatin, Osvobozhdenie ot illyuzii. Kemerovo: Kemerovskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1992, 183 pp.

Robert T. Huber & Donald R. Kelley, eds., Perestroika‐Era Politics: The New Legislature and Gorbachev's Political Reforms. New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1991, viii + 246 pp., £39.95.

Gavin Peebles. A Short History of Socialist Money. London and Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991, xiii + 170 pp., £30.00 h/b, £11.95 p/b.

Vitalii A. Naishul’, The Supreme and Last Stage of Socialism, Centre for Research into Communist Economies, New Series 2, 1991, 48 pp., £3.50.

Anders Aslund, ed., Market Socialism or the Restoration of Capitalism? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, x + 215 pp., $49.50, £30.00.

Anthony Jones & William Moskoff, Ko‐ops: The Rebirth of Entrepreneurship in the Soviet Union. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991, xvii+ 153 pp., £20.00 h/b, £9.50 p/b.

Marshall I. Goldman, What Went Wrong with Perestroika. London: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd, 1991, 258 pp., £12.95.

Leah A. Haus, Globalizing Gatt: The Soviet Union's Successor States, Eastern European and the International Trading System. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992, x + 141 pp., $38.95 h/b, $10.95 p/b.

Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Erik P. Hoffman, Robbin F. Laird, eds, Soviet Foreign Policy: Classic and Contemporary Issues. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991, xviii + 857 pp., DM 178 h/b, DM 98 p/b. Also published as Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Erik P. Hofmann, Robbin F. Laird, eds, Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy: From Lenin to Brezhnev. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991, xvi + 349 pp., DM 48 p/b; and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. Erik P. Hoffmann, Robbin F. Laird, eds, Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy: From Brezhnev to Gorbachev. New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991, xviii+ 521 pp., DM 54 p/b.

Steven Kull, Burying Lenin. The Revolution in Soviet Ideology & Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. xvi + 219 pp., £10.95 p/b.

Lowell Dittmer, Sino‐Soviet Normalisation and Its International Implications, 1945–1990. Seattle, WA, and London: University of Washington Press, 1992, vii + 373 pp., $35.00.

Haim Shemesh, Soviet‐Iraqi Relations, 1986–1988: In the Shadow of the Iraq‐Iran Conflict. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1992, x + 285 pp., £31.95.

Larry E. Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse: Reforming Education in Soviet Russia, 1917–1931. Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press (Distributed in UK by Open University Press), 1991, xv + 215 pp., £18.50.

Beatrice Farnsworth & Lynne Viola, eds, Russian Peasant Women, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 304 pp., £13.50 p/b.

George Sanford, ed. and transl., Democratization in Poland, 1988–90. London: Macmillan, 1992, xv + 203 pp., £40.00.

Tania Konn, ed., Soviet Studies Guide. London: Bowker‐Saur, 1992, xvi + 237 pp., £39.00 h/b.     

Institution Building and Spillovers

This paper investigates the importance of institution building for economic growth in transition economies of Eastern Europe and CIS‐States. Using recent data, it shows that even in a Guardian State, institutions like property rights protection, administration efficiency, and general rule of low matter. They appear to be even more crucial for economic take‐off than standard economic factors like for example macroeconomic policy. Moreover, this paper finds that there are important spillover effects in institution building, and that countries which get one specific institution right, have also better chances to succeed in making other specific institutions work properly.     

The fragility of an independent judiciary: Lessons from Hungary and Poland–and the European Union

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.     

Constitutional analysis: The power index approach

Abstract. A power index approach to the EU institutions gives a new perspective upon the EU institutions and their future reform. Using a standard power measure, the Banzhaf index, we show that in a group of states as the EU council, the voting power of a member state is equal to twice the individual power to block multiplied by the group's collective power to change. Political power of the member states is calculated under alternative constitutional rules for the EU, where cooperative game theory allows the derivation of power equivalences. We suggest that simple majority should be used more often in the EU council.     

"The More Things Change…": Business Litigation and Governance in the American Automobile Industry

Business litigation is a relatively neglected area of corporate governance, particularly given its enormous rise in the United States over the past generation. As a preliminary effort to engage this issue, we examine dispute avoidance and resolution in the automotive sector since the early 1970s-focusing on relationships between auto manufacturers and their suppliers and dealers. We generally presume intercorporate litigation to be a "last resort" in business practice, chosen only on the breakdown of less costly means of dispute avoidance or resolution; we take such breakdown typically to be caused by shifts in the terms of competition among firms (e. g., increased competition, instability, uncertainty); and we expect that, over time, the costs of litigation will motivate efforts to construct new structures of nonlitigious dispute resolution. In the case of the U. S. auto industry, we find disruptive shifts in the terms of competition and increased recourse to litigation. Throughout, however, this litigation effect is mitigated by the dominance of major manufacturers over their suppliers and dealers. Over time, it is further dampened by industry development of mechanisms for arbitration or other nonlitigious dispute resolution.     

Fear of Gang Crime: A Look at Three Theoretical Models

Gang crime and resulting public fear became a major policy focus during the 1990s, yet few studies specifically focus on fear of gang crime. Guided by social disorganization theory, we test three theoretical models about the individual thought processes leading to fear of gang crime. Using structural equation models, we find that each of these three theories—diversity, disorder, and community concern—is an important predictor of gang-related fear. In addition, we find that the indirect relationships between demographic characteristics, theoretical variables, and fear depend upon which model is tested.     

Third world neutralism and British Cold War strategy, 1960-62

European decolonization appeared to the Western powers to open up fresh areas of the globe to Cold War competition. Concerned by the coincidence of Afro-Asian and Sovier pressure on the European colonial powers, and preoccupied with the redefinition of Britain's global role in the wake of decolonization, the British Foreign Office was convinced, despite much evidence to the contrary, that the West needed to champion 'neutralism' in order to prevent the Afro-Asian states from orienting towards the Soviet sphere. This article argues that this policy was determined more by their anxieties about Anglo-American relations in the wake of decolonization than by a deeply held conviction of the imminence of the extension of the communist world.     

Mass homicide and suicide deadliness and outcome

A study of 98 lone, rampage killers in the United States from 1949 to 1999 found that those who were killed by police officers killed and wounded more victims than those who completed suicide who, in turn, killed or wounded more victims than those who were captured. Those rampage killers who completed suicide were less likely to be judged schizophrenic and more likely to be killing present or former co-workers.     

From-Long Term To Short-Term Contracting

One can look at the arrival of New Public Management and the extensive public sector reforms inspired by this theory from many angles. Here we examine the shift from long-term contracting, typical of bureaucracy and traditional enterprises, to short-term contracting, borrowed from private sector governance methods. Short-term contracting has three principal uses in the governance of the public sector: (a) contracting with service providers after a tendering/bidding process; (b) contracting with the CEOs of the incorporated public enterprises; and (c) contracting with executive agencies about what they should deliver. Theoretical analysis, supported by substantial empirical evidence, suggests that short-term contracting eliminates the extensive post-contractual opportunism connected with long-term contracting, but is vulnerable to precontractual opportunism. Short-term contracting is not just another public sector reform fad, but constitutes a new tool for government which increases efficiency when handled with prudence.