Decoding Divergence in Software Regulation: Paradigms,Power Structures,and Institutions in the United States and the European Union

Both in the United States and the European Union, patent policy instruments in information and communication technologies are contested. Although current reform proposals would lead to a uniform patent eligibility for computer programs in both economic spheres, such an outcome is rather unlikely. In a theoretic perspective, contrasting policies in one of the most important technology sectors challenge the expectation of converging regulative regimes. In a view to reveal the structural causes for the persisting divergence, it is argued that incompatible underlying paradigms, differentiated patterns of power structure, and unsynchronized institutional arrangements may resist even strong pressures to harmonize regulative practices. The interaction between these elements will be addressed and discussed as a perspective to define restraints on the scope of convergence theories.     

BEYOND THE BELL CURVE: COMMUNITY DISADVANTAGE AND THE EXPLANATION OF BLACK‐WHITE DIFFERENCES IN ADOLESCENT VIOLENCE*

Disproportionate involvement in violent behavior among African American, versus white, adolescents is a major arena of debate in the social sciences. The individual difference approach draws attention to verbal ability as an explanation of black‐white differences in violence. Sociological theories stress variation in community and family socioeconomic disadvantage. We contrast these causal images of racial differences in serious violence using the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health and contextual modeling. Results indicate that verbal ability has an indirect effect on violence through school achievement, but does not account for the greater involvement in violence among black adolescents. The analysis is most consistent with a sociological model that views the race‐violence link as a spurious outcome of community context.     

Detention Patterns of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants

This study examines the detention patterns of the insanity defendant who is successful with the plea and hospitalized, or unsuccessful and incarcerated. Further comparisons are made with felony defendants who never entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). From existing data it is unclear to what extent detention may vary if the plea is successful as compared to if it is not successful. Of all defendants who entered a plea of NGRI in Erie County, New York (Buffalo) between 1970 and 1980, 128 were institutionalized as a result of their disposition. Sociodemographic, institutionalization histories, arrest, and disposition information were collected and analyzed for all 128 individuals. The research evaluates differences in the likelihood and length of either institutionalization or incarceration and in the rates of release between successful NGRI defendants, those who entered the plea unsuccessfully, and those who did not plead NGRI. From the findings reported here the authors conclude that pleading NGRI in Eric County may not be quite as advantageous for a defendant as commonly is believed.     

The Economic Sources of Congressional Approval

Abstract Models of congressional approval have, in both theory and specification, often imitated models of presidential approval. Through their modeling decisions, researchers have implicitly assumed that the economic determinants of presidential and congressional approval are identical. Such assumptions have discouraged other researchers from testing competing hypotheses about the economic determinants of congressional approval. Using aggregate‐level time‐series analysis, this study investigates the question of whether or not the economic determinants of approval vary by the target of political judgment. I find that presidential approval is driven largely by sociotropic prospections, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, I find the public relies most heavily upon egocentric retrospections when judging the U.S. Congress.