External and Domestic Determinants of Education Expansion: How Germany, Japan, and Switzerland Have Varied

How do economically successful countries like Germany, Japan and Switzerland differ in their post-primary education policies? After identifying great variations in the structure and capacity of secondary and higher education sectors, explanations are sought in terms of domestic and inter-national factors. Switzerland and Japan emerge as polar cases in how political variables - such as centralism-federalism, parties and bureaucracies - affected choice of vehicles and extent of educational expansion. Party influence is most clearcut in Germany, but varies by sector. Whereas German and Japanese reform agendas changed in the aftermath of occupation experiences, Switzerland went its own way until prospects for European integration induced greater accommodation to the training and credential practices of its neighbors.     

A PROSPECTIVE TEST OF A CRIMINAL CAREER MODEL*

In an earlier article in this journal, Barnett, Blumstein, and Farrington (1987) formulated a model that described the criminal careers of the multiple offenders in a cohort of London males that had been studied from their 10th to 25th birthdays. That model involved two subpopulations of offenders (denoted as “frequents” and “occasionals”), each characterized by a constant annual conviction rate (μ) and a constant probability (p) of terminating the career following a conviction. This article describes the results of a prospective and predictive test of the model using new data collected on the same offenders from their 25th to 30th birthdays. The original model accurately predicted the number of recidivists, the degree of recidivism risk, the total number of recidivist convictions, and the time intervals between recidivist convictions. However, the predictions for the frequents suffered some distortions introduced by a few “intermittent” offenders who seemed to have terminated their careers, but who re-initiated offending during the test period after a long gap.     

How federalism influences welfare spending: Belgium federalism reform through the perspective of the synthetic control method

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.     

NETWORKING FOR AUTONOMY? NATIONAL AGENCIES IN EUROPEAN NETWORKS

The environment of national agencies has changed considerably in recent years as they increasingly become engaged in European Union networks. This article contributes to a growing body of literature on those networks and their effect on executive politics at the national level by asking whether and how the EU involvement of national agencies affects the agencies' autonomy in policy formulation. We develop an analytical model for explaining the effect of EU involvement on agency autonomy. Analyzing data from a comprehensive survey of federal agencies in Germany, we find that EU involvement has a positive effect on national agencies' policy autonomy. Moreover, we find a somewhat stronger effect of agency involvement in sectoral networks on autonomy than in intergovernmental networks, which is attributed to information asymmetries between ministries and agencies. Yet this effect is weaker than initially expected, which can be explained by a considerable degree of overlap between different types of EU involvement.     

不要惊慌

七年前的一个夏天,我开车带着全家在高速公路上兜风,孩子们都坐在后座上。突然,妻子在车内发现了一只蜜蜂,于是一场恐慌随之而来。“这儿有一只蜜蜂!”派格几乎尖叫起来,“快停车!”但我当时的感觉是,与其让车在慌乱中乱撞,还不如让我们每个人都被蜜蜂蜇一下。“把车窗摇下来,”我说,“也许它会离开。”“快停车!”派格仍然坚持着,已经