Unemployment and crime: the role of apprehension

An increase in the unemployment rate decreases the opportunity cost of crime and increases the crime rate according to standard microeconomics models. However, a large body of empirical research has shown that an increase in unemployment may increase or decrease crime. By incorporating the return to crime into standard economic models, this paper shows that an increase in unemployment, as in recessions, decreases the opportunity cost of crime and the return to crime as well. As a result, the effect of unemployment on crime is ambiguous and depends on the apprehension rate. An increase in the unemployment rate tends to decrease the crime rate at lower apprehension rates, but to increase it at higher apprehension rates. An increase in the generosity of unemployment insurance benefits does not necessarily reduce the crime rate, and the effect of more generous unemployment insurance on crime depends again on the apprehension rate.     

Consolidating the new regulatory state in Germany? The new energy regime of 2005

It is the purpose of this article to describe and analyse recent developments of the new regulatory state in Germany. Due to substantial changes in the regime governing energy regulation in 2005, it is suggested that we witness a trend towards consolidation. By consolidation, the article refers primarily to cross-sectoral institutional and instrumental homogeneity, possibly caused by the transfer of regime elements from sector to sector. It is argued that both traditions of state-societal co-operation as well as sector structures (i.e., incumbent suppliers) are key factors to explain regime emergence and change also in the energy sector.