Education and mass belief systems: An extension and some new questions

Using the SRC/CPS's national election surveys from 1956 to 1976, this paper investigates the effect of education on consistency among the public's domestic policy opinions. Evidence from both gamma correlations and factor analysis indicates that education has neither a strong nor a linear effect on issue constraint over the 20 years covered by the data, for the lowest and the highest education strata consistently show the highest levels of constraint. We do not conclude, however, that education is unrelated to recognition of ideological concepts, for almost one-half of the lowest education stratum do not use liberal and conservative terms. We conclude that issue constraint does not directly translate into ideology and suggest some new directions that future research should take if we are to evaluate effectively the effect of education on opinion structuring.A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 1978 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.     

Introducing “Cooperative Push”: How Inefficient Environmental Policy (Sometimes!) Protects the Global Commons Better

In this paper we argue that the incentive structures of the gamesnations play in international environmental negotiations dependupon the choice of environmental policy instruments. Bargainingon the use of some instrument (e.g. an effluent charge) mayput the players into a dilemma game (like Chicken). Negotiationsto apply a different instrument (say, an emission reductionquota) may lead to a cooperation game (like Stag Hunt). The higherthe incentive to cooperate in the type of game which is built upby a specific instrument, the higher is this instrument's``cooperative push''. Of course, comparing two instruments,the one with the higher cooperative push might well be the lessefficient one. In this Paper, we analyse a situation where thehigher cooperative push of an instrument overcompensates thisinstrument's lower efficiency: Aggregate welfare withbilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of Stag Hunt) is higher than withunilateral cooperation (the equilibrium of the Chicken game).The question remains whether sovereign countries decide to playStag Hunt ending up in the welfare superior equilibrium. It isshown below that they do not in an uncoordinated optimising setting.However, we develop a particular frame where the proposedsolution meets the criteria of individual rationality,stability and fairness. It thereby establishes the politically mostdesired result – international cooperation.     

Intimate Partner Violence Perpetration from Adolescence to Young Adulthood: Trajectories and the Role of Familial Factors

Prior empirical research on intimate partner violence (IPV) in adolescence and young adulthood often focuses on exposure to violence in the family-of-origin using retrospective and cross-sectional data. Yet individuals’ families matter beyond simply the presence or absence of abuse, and these effects may vary across time. To address these issues, the present study employed five waves of longitudinal data from the Toledo Adolescent Relationships Study (TARS) to investigate the trajectory of IPV from adolescence to young adulthood (N = 950 respondents, 4,750 person-periods) with a specific focus on how familial factors continue to matter across the life course. Results indicated that family-of-origin violence and parent-child relationship quality were independent predictors of IPV. The effect of parent-child relationship quality on IPV also became greater as individuals aged. These results have implications for policies targeted at reducing IPV.     

B: THE NORMATIVE/IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF POLICY FORMATION FAMILY POLICY: HAS THE UNITED STATES LEARNED FROM EUROPE?

"Family Policy" is a term that is used increasingly in the U.S. to describe policies affecting children and their families. In this article, the authors focus on whether societal learning has occurred across the Atlantic with regard to family policy and what, if anything, the U.S. has learned or borrowed from Europe. The authors conclude that there has been some borrowing, albeit modest; currently, some of that learning is reflected in an expanding child policy debate.     

Deadlines,routines, and change

Routines, the habitual and predictable behavior patterns of an organization, play central roles in both maintaining organizational performance and in adapting such performance to changing conditions. Deadlines interact with routines in important ways in influencing the course of organizational adaptation. This paper examines the role of routines and deadlines in influencing change in a regulatory program. It describes the adaptation of routines in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) water pollution and pesticide programs in response to pressures and deadlines imposed by Congress, the courts, and the White House. The programs analyzed offer contrasting glimpses of the effects of routines on organizational change. Routines may be collective and shared by the members of an organization or unique to the specific groups or subgroups within it. When the organization primarily has widely-shared routines, few options will be perceived; consequently, collective routines tend to blunt the impact of pressures for change. On the other hand, routines that become fragmented, diverse, and individual in the face of repeated external pressures may facilitate change.