Long–Serving City Managers: Practical Application of the Academic Literature

The authors identified 146 city managers who have served in the same city for the past 20 years and asked them to complete a survey to determine the factors leading to their long service. As a part of the survey, the city managers were invited to express, in their own words, the reasons they had stayed in the same city for such an extended time compared to the average tenure for city managers. In the article that follows, the authors quote from the academic literature statements pertaining to practical issues of concern to city managers and the elected officials for whom they work, giving credence to the applicability of the academic literature to today's city management profession. Following the quotations from the literature, the authors present the heartfelt reflections of these senior city managers on their long careers in public service.     

Indexing civil commitment in psychiatric emergency rooms.

A reliable prototype index, Three Ratings of Involuntary Admissibility (TRIAD), was developed to reflect the way psychiatric emergency room clinicians apply legal criteria for involuntary commitment. The interrater reliability coefficients--Pearson's r--of the TRIAD system for rating patients are 0.94, danger-to-self score; 0.89, danger-to-other score; 0.77, grave-disability score; and 0.89, total-admissibility score. TRIAD scores accounted for 82 percent of 89 disposition decisions in two metropolitan county hospital psychiatric emergency rooms. Study results indicate that (1) psychiatric emergency room clinicians shared constructs of danger to self, danger to others, and grave disability; (2) these constructs are reliably applied in actual cases; (3) TRIAD is a valid reflection of these constructs; and (4) case disposition is predictable from the severity of the patient's status with regard to these criteria.     

Reviews

Vladimir Shlapentokh, Soviet Intellectuals and Political Power: The Post‐Stalin Era. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1990, xiv + 321 pp., £19.95

Jadwiga Staniszkis, The Dynamics of the Breakthrough in Eastern Europe. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991, xiii + 303 pp., £25.00, $35.00.

Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms, 1985–1990. London: Philip Allan, 1990, xiv + 459 pp., £35.00 h/b, £12.95 p/b.

Julian Cooper, The Soviet Defence Industry: Conversion and Reform. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, ix + 111 pp., £22.50 h/b, £8.95 p/b.

Elizabeth Winiecki & Jan Winiecki, The Structural Legacy of the Soviet‐Type Economy. London: CRCE, 1992, 133 pp., £6.50 p/b.

Marsha Siefert, ed., Mass Culture and Perestroika in the Soviet Union. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 200 pp., $35.00.

Anne White, De‐Stalinization and the House of Culture. Declining state control over leisure in the USSR, Poland and Hungary, 1953–89. London and New York: Routledge, 1990, x+195 pp., £30.00.

Deborah Adelman, The ‘Children of Perestroika’. Moscow Teenagers Talk About Their Lives and the Future. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 1991, xxiii + 256 pp., $24.95.

Michael Marrese & Sándor Richter, eds, The Challenge of Simultaneous Economic Relations with East and West. London: Macmillan, 1990, xviii + 216 pp., £45.00.

David W. Hunter, Western Trade Pressure on the Soviet Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1991, xii + 163 pp., £45.00

Pierre Maurer, La Reconciliation Sovieto‐Yougoslave, 1954–1958: Illusions et Disillusions de Tito. Cousset, Fribourg: Editions Delval, 1991, 474 pp., no price.     

Political Culture, Political System Characteristics, and Public Policies Among the American States

Daniel Elazar's typology of political culture is updated forall states for 1980 using religious affiliation data. On average,the political culture indices do not vary much from simitarmeasures constructed for 1906–1936. The effects of politicalculture on state politics and policy are tested in two ways:(1) by calculating partial correlation coefficients for tendependent variables holding four environmental variables constant(affluence, industrialization, fertility, and liberal politicalideology), and (2) by estimating regression equations withintwo categories of political culture (individualistic and traditionalistic)to gauge the indirect or contextual effects of culture. Thepartial correlation analysis yields the expected outcome—moralisticstates have more interparty competition, higher voter turnout,more policy-relevant parties, and more liberal and innovativepolicies; traditionalistic states show the opposite result.The attempt to assess the contextual effects of political cultureproves less satisfactory. No such effects appear for about halfthe dependent variables, and the contextual effects that arefound correspond only in part to expectations.     

Power and agency in the human security framework

The concept of human security is arguably a progressive move away from the narrow conceptions of military and territorial security that have traditionally dominated international relations. The human security framework is argued to have the potential to empower and emancipate individuals by putting them at the centre of policy, analysis and debate and addressing the problems they face in their daily lives. In this paper I will argue that the human security framework cannot live up to its promises to empower the citizens of poor and developing countries. Whilst the human security framework problematizes the relationship between the state and its citizens, the framework replaces this relationship with relationships with other states or international agencies that lack accountability, effectively further disempowering citizens in weak or unstable states. The human security framework serves to reinforce international power inequalities and renders criteria for intervention by powerful states and international institutions less transparent and less accountable.     

Iran’s Latin America Strategy: 2005 to Present

Iran has expanded its trade relations with Latin America since 2005. Many argue that the reasons for such activities are for financial gain and to bypass the sanctions. This article argues that economic gain are miniscule and that the primary objectives of Iran are two-fold: first, to assist its nuclear program; and second, to develop deterrence against the U.S. possible military option against Iran.