Comparison of the criminal statistics of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany

A systematic procedure for comparing the criminal statistics of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany is presented. The procedure was developed after (1) reviewing and translating applicable paragraphs of the Federal Republic of Germany's Penal Code and (2) reviewing both the formal and informal processes used in both countries for recording crime statistics. Subsequently, a detailed comparison of criminal statistics was made using this comparative procedure.     

Terminating the oldest living regulator: the death of the interstate commerce commission

This paper examines the termination of the oldest federal regulatory agency, in light of existing policy termination theories. The need for the ICC was severely reduced by major deregulation of railroads and trucking in 1980, changes from which also reduced the ICC's ability to maintain external interest group support. Still, although its budget and staff were cut, the ICC survived intact for 15 more years, until budgetary politics found it to be a useful symbolic target for termination. We also argue that this case shows the utility of putting termination theory into the larger framework of policy change, a literature that itself has largely ignored the critical element of policy and organizational termination.

”Once you establish a commission … you have the devil's own time passing an act abolishing it.”⁽¹⁾.     

State Telecommunications Policy in the 1980s

The role of the states in provision of telecommunications services combines aspects of regulation, economic development policy, tax policy, and government procurement. A variety of policy experiments, contrasts sharply with a dearth of state action in telecommunications prior to 1982. The growing realization that the implications of decisions about telecommunications are no longer narrowly confined to regulation has spurred the active involvement of governors and legislators in many states.     

The economic theory of regulation and trucking deregulation: Shifting to the state level

Federal deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980 created a general gain in economic welfare at the expense of the monopoly rents of powerful interests, leading some scholars to ponder the limitations of the economic theory of regulation. However, analyzing only the federal changes excludes evidence from the significant intrastate sector of the trucking industry, regulation of which remains largely unchanged from that prior to 1980. This paper argues that after a decade of clear federal policy success, truckers continue to capture most state regulators, sustaining monopoly rents in what would otherwise be an inherently competitive industry. Using data from the fifty states, we demonstrate the extent to which the economic theory is in fact consistent with trucking industry evidence.