The checks and balances of party federalism: German federal government in a divided legislature

In this study, we assess the potential for policy change of the German government of Helmut Kohl after unification combining party positions with formal bicameral settings in a spatial model of legislative action. We distinguish between two policy areas and two types of legislation, mandatory and non–mandatory legislation imposing either a symmetric or asymmetric power distribution between both German chambers. In order to identify German legislators' party positions in different policy areas, we use data from ECPR Party Manifesto research covering the period from German unification in 1990 to the end of the government of Helmut Kohl in 1998. We find that the federal government of Helmut Kohl had a policy leadership position until April 1991 with no procedural differences, but the gridlock danger for governmental proposals was higher on the societal than the economic dimension. Afterwards, the government's potential for policy change was considerably determined by the type of legislation, independently from the policy dimension. At the end of the Kohl era, the governmental policy leadership position was limited to policies that left even the opposition majority of German states better off. The procedural settings mattered greatly on the economic dimension, and the danger of gridlock on societal policy was smaller only for non–mandatory legislation.     

How partnership works

Partnerships can achieve results, but they do not develop smoothly. Members must explore their differences before they can perform well together. Some agencies look inwards at their own priorities and expect their partners to follow them. This leads to a blend of co-operation and competition. Other organisations turn outwards and look for partners who can contribute to shared results. They see themselves as others see them. They do not look back to make sure that others are following. This leads to a blend of mutual respect and reciprocity which is as important for success as finely honed memoranda of understanding.     

The application of immunoblotting to the phenotyping of haptoglobin.

An immunoblotting method for phenotyping haptoglobin in serum and bloodstains has been developed. Haptoglobin isoproteins were separated by polyacrylamide gradient gel electrophoresis and then transferred to nitrocellulose by electroblotting. The use of 1 mm gels facilitated more rapid and effective transfer than conventional 3 mm thick gels. Nitrocellulose blots were developed by double antibody enzyme immunoassay. The detection limit for serum and bloodstains was improved 16 times compared to conventional staining using O-tolidine. The method could detect haptoglobin phenotypes from 0.001 microliter of whole blood. This detection limit is approximately 8 times lower than that of group specific-component analysis by immunoblotting.     

Rank injustice?: How the scoring method for cross-country running competitions violates major social choice principles

The scoring method used by high schools and colleges in the U.S. to determine which team wins a cross-country meet can violate a major social choice principle, referred to here as Independence from Irrelevant Teams: whether team A is scored as defeating or losing to team B can depend on whether team C’s performance is included in the calculations. In addition, if a three-way meet is scored as three dual meets, the scoring method can produce a cycle, thereby violating the principle of Transitivity: team A beats team B, team B beats team C, but team C beats team A. Real-world violations of Independence and Transitivity are reported from a high school cross-country meet held in Michigan in the U.S. in 2003. Several results are presented about the conditions under which these two principles can be violated. An alternative scoring method that will violate neither Independence nor Transitivity is also discussed and evaluated.     

Individualisierte Wahlkämpfe im Wahlkreis. Eine Analyse am Beispiel des Bundestagswahlkampfes von 2005

Constituency campaigns are an important subject matter for students of political parties, voting behavior and political communication. In all three fields, constituency campaigns are perceived as elements of centralized high-tech campaigns strategically targeting particular segments in electoral markets. In this paper, we propose an alternative understanding of local campaigns and use the case of the German Parliamentary Elections in 2005 to provide empirical evidence for this view. We analyze constituency campaigns from an actor-centred perspective, which assumes local campaigns to signal independence of individual candidates from their parties. We label this phenomenon individualized campaigning. We argue that individualized campaigning is, on the one hand, driven by changing electoral markets. On the other hand, we argue, however, that electoral incentives and particular types of electoral competitiveness foster individualized constituency campaigning. We test this latter hypothesis with regard to the German mixed-member electoral system and on the basis of a survey of all candidates standing for election in 2005.     

Individual learning and building organisational capacity for development

Building capacities and capabilities for international development is an ongoing subject for debate, further fuelled by recent interest in learning and knowledge. This article focuses on how, and the extent to which, individual learners in education and training programmes for development policy and management interact with their organisations to build capacities and capabilities. It demonstrates some of the ways that individual learning and organisational capacity are linked by examining case studies from Uganda, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The article reflects on the complex nature of this interaction and on the broader challenges of linking learning to development. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Life Cycle of the Government-Sponsored Enterprise: Lessons for Design and Accountability

The federal government uses government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) to allocate credit to sectors such as housing and agriculture that are considered to deserve special support. The GSEs illustrate the importance of life cycle in the design and accountability of federal agencies and instrumentalities. Four case studies are presented here. In general, market and political dominance and rapid growth are inherent in GSE design. Dominance means inadequate feedback, which can foster poor management and financial risk. Government lacks an exit strategy for GSEs that have outlived their usefulness. Government should systematically review the organizational structure, accountability, and design of all agencies and instrumentalities, both at inception and over their life cycles.