Growth behavior of the blue blowfly Calliphora vicina maggots

Fifty-three clusters of blowfly eggs of the genus Calliphora vicina were observed in the laboratory up to the hatching stage under reproducible and virtually field-like conditions. Rearing the larvae was then continued up to pupation, the larval growth in length being recorded several times a day. As the object was to study the dependence of the larvae increase in length on the temperature conditions in vitro, the substratal humidity and food supply were kept unchanged during the entire study. The temperature ranged from 6.5 degrees C to 35 degrees C, with the temperature for the individual cluster kept constant during the entire developmental process. Data on about 5500 measured larvae were statistically evaluated. The basic result established was that in the case of the blowfly of the genus Calliphora vicina in vivo, all developmental stages relevant to the entomologic determination of the time of death depend on the temperature conditions: (1) the duration of the egg stage increases with decreasing temperature; (2) the speed of larval growth is slower at lower temperatures; (3) the maximal larval length is reached earlier at higher temperatures; (4) the mean value of maximal length decreases with increasing temperature; (5) larvae under all temperature conditions decrease in size after having reached their maximal length, the decrease in length being more rapid at higher temperatures; (6) constant temperatures over 30 degrees C lead to "stunted forms" which do not pupate and die; (7) constant temperatures under approximately 16 degrees C after the peak of growth has been reached inhibit the readiness to pupate, which causes the larvae to fall into a stationary state of rest, which will be interrupted only when the temperature is raised and resumption of the metamorphosis is thus induced. To allow rapid reconstruction of the larval age in general practice, the established growth data were set out in the form of a diagram designated isomegalendiagram, which permits temperature-fluctuation-related entomologic determination of the time of death with a maximum degree of accuracy.     

Civil Society,Populism and Liberalism

This paper considers the threats that various kinds of populism might be said to pose to the ideal of a civil society that mediates between ‘private’ and family life and the state. Although it is difficult to generalise about populisms, just about all—whether on left or right—share a hostility to ‘intermediate’ powers. Of course civil society is exactly what could be called a forum for intermediate powers. In contrast, populists often tend to emphasise a vision of immediate power in the sense of the possibility of the direct expression of the people’s will in political institutions. Populists, of whatever pitch, often tend to invoke a partisan state that will be on the side of the people (however defined) rather than a putatively neutral ‘liberal’ state that stands over and against civil society. These factors make most populisms more or less generically hostile to liberalism, understood not in ideological terms but more as a doctrine which emphasises the necessity of mediating power through institutions. Very often, populism is a threat to the idea of civil society understood as a concept integral to liberal political theory, as a means of balancing the state and its wider interlocutors. In this paper, various means, largely inspired by the writings of Tocqueville on the one hand and Paul Hirst on the other, are suggested for addressing aspects of this predicament.

     

Stuck in the Middle: Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry,the U.S.-China Tech Fight,and Cross-Strait Stability

The Trump administration has worked to restrict the People's Republic of China's ability to manufacture and acquire semiconductor chips since 2018. Caught in the crossfire of this burgeoning tech war is Taiwan, which is home to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the world's largest semiconductor chip manufacturer. With the United States banning companies that use U.S. technology in their chip manufacturing process from doing business with Huawei, TSMC can no longer do business with the Chinese tech company, one of its most important clients. Until the Trump administration announced the license restriction on Huawei, TSMC had managed to walk the fine line of doing business with both China and the United States, without riling either. This article argues that the TSMC example is indicative of how great power competition between the two countries will play out for the foreseeable future. TSMC has announced that it will build a new factory in Arizona as it faces Chinese firms poaching its employees and Chinese actors hacking its systems and code for trade secrets—all actions demonstrating how great power competition will play out for tech dominance. Avoiding direct live-fire conflict, China and the United States will work to restrict the other's actions and development by forcing important tech companies, such as TSMC, into picking a side.