Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

Despite extensive research on Eurosceptic challenger parties, our knowledge of their influence on political opposition has so far been sparse. In this article we make an in‐depth assessment of parliamentary EU opposition, based on 4,264 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committees (EACs) of Denmark and Sweden. Our analysis shows that the presence of Eurosceptic challenger parties in the national parliamentary arena impacts patterns and practices of EU opposition significantly. A greater presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in parliament is associated with more opposition in EU politics. These parties deliver a vast majority of the polity‐oriented opposition towards the EU and present more policy alternatives than mainstream parties. The findings presented have implications for our understanding of national parliamentary EU opposition as well as for the assessment of the impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties on the process of European integration.     

The Balkan experience: Explanations of public affairs and interest group activity

This final article is a synthesis of findings from the seven country studies in this special issue. Although there are characteristics common to all group systems, particularly those transitioning to democracy, there are also significant differences. Analysis of these differences reveals a direct relationship between both the level of socioeconomic and political development and the characteristics of the group systems in all Balkan countries. In addition, we provide new insights into group system development and operation. These are particularly related to the impact of war, inter‐ethnic cleavages, constitutional arrangements (majoritarian and consociational), economic crises, geopolitics, and the major presence of external interests.     

The poverty reports,negative income taxation,and the constitution: an analysis and a compromise proposal†

Abstract. After some background discussion of the causes of and solutions to the problem of poverty, and an evaluation of the two recently published reports on this subject, the paper focuses on some political and economic constraints that are likely to be critical to the success of any proposal for a guaranteed annual income. Among these are the constitutional issue of who should control any GAI scheme, the relationship between a GAI and the present tax system, and the appropriateness of uniform guarantee levels across the nation. A compromise GAI scheme is then proposed which attempts to satisfy the relevant constraints, both economic and constitutional. Sommaire. Après une discussion préliminaire des causes de la pauvreté et de ses solutions possibles, ainsi qu'une évaluation des deux récents rapports sur le sujet, l'auteur étudie certaines contraintes politiques et économiques susceptibles de devenir des éléments critiques pour le succès de toute proposition de revenu annuel garanti. Entre autres, sont discutés, le probème constitutionnel du siège de l'autorité sur un plan de revenu annuel garanti, de la relation entre un tel plan et le présent système de taxation et de la désirabilité de niveaux unifonnes garantis à 1'échelle nationale. Enfin, un compromis est offert sous la forme d'un plan qui s'efforce de satisfaire les contraintes pertinentes de nature économique et constitutionnelle.     

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification foreminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood.This article models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework,where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land fora large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminentdomain, holdouts are a significant threat, resulting in costlydelay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminentdomain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain,thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiateprices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessivetransfer of land to the developer.     

Economic crises, capital transfer restrictions and investor protection under modern investment treaties

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• Capital liberalization was the norm of internationaleconomic relations until the Economic Depression of the 1930swhen exchange restrictions became an important instrument ofeconomic policy of many countries.
• The IMF Articles of Agreementwere the outcome of efforts by several countries to providean acceptable international legal framework that would minimizethe negative impact of exchange restrictions while at the sametime preserving the right of Member States to impose exchangerestrictions when faced with balance-of-payment problems.
• Thatposition is to a large extent maintained by most modern investmenttreaties although subject to heightened scrutiny by internationalarbitral tribunals under the disciplines of expropriation, nationaltreatment and fair and equitable treatment standards among othersin order to protect investors’ interests whilst safeguardinghost states, regulatory autonomy.