The Economics of Cruel and Unusual Punishment

It has sometimes been argued that one way to reduce the costs of law enforcement would be to reduce the probability of detection and conviction (hence saving those costs), while at the same time increasing the size of the punishment. Following this strategy would keep the expected costs (to a risk neutral criminal) of committing a crime constant and hence keep the deterrence level constant; it would have the benefit, though, of reducing costs to the rest of society.There are some well-known objections to such a policy. One such objection deals with marginal deterrence: A convicted murderer serving a life sentence with no chance of parole in a jurisdiction which bans capital punishment has nothing to lose from killing a prison guard—there is no marginal deterrence to the commission of a more serious crime or any additional crime for that matter. In fact, so long as there remains any upper limit to the amount of punishment that can be inflicted upon a convicted criminal, the only ways to create some type of marginal deterrence are to reduce the punishments for less serious crimes, which will either reduce the deterrence of those less serious crimes, or alternatively to require the use of more of society's scarce resources to increase the probabilities of apprehension and conviction.It is possible to reduce this marginal deterrence problem, however, by practicing cruel and unusual punishment on perpetrators of serious crimes, i.e. by raising the limits of allowable punishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests this practice is followed unofficially with child molesters and killers of prison guards and hence provides some additional deterrence against these crimes.Despite the theoretical validity of this argument, our society has chosen to impose a constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Furthermore, over time we seem to have lowered the threshold of what is considered cruel and unusual. Following Dr. Pangloss, the concluding section of the paper examines why rational maximizers would choose to give up this additional potential deterrence. The explanations depend upon an assumed positive income elasticity of demand for humanitarianism or for insurance against the costs of punishing the innocent. While there are some reasons to accept the humanitarianism argument, the insurance argument seems more persuasive.     

The experimental psychologist in court

This special issue comprises articles by psychologists, legal scholars, and ethicists on the ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists. In it the major ethical questions facing the prospective expert witness are clarified, and alternative positions on these issues are defined and debated. Fundamentals of moral reasoning are discussed, and the realities of interaction with a judicial system that subjects the psychologist to a variety of pressures and limitations are made apparent. The aim is not to offer final answers to complex ethical questions, but rather to provide a framework within which the questions can be considered by the individual psychologist.The conference on ethics of expert testimony by experimental psychologists was supported by National Science Foundation grant No. ISP-8209940. We thank Rachelle Hollander of the Ethics and Values in Science and Technology Program, Joe Young of the Memory and Cognitive Processes Program, and Eric Juengst of the National Endowment for the Humanities for their help in bringing about the conference.     

Police grantsmanship: A case study

Police leadership is increasingly dependent on community oriented policing (COPS) federal grants because of diminishing financial resources. This paper demonstrates the importance of excellent police grantsmanship skills while simultaneously providing theoretical and concrete steps for achieving a successful grant package. Furthermore, a case study example is presented where COPS grants and federal funding assisted in the acquisition of community-oriented and problem-solving strategic objectives.     

Implementing Change in an Urban School District: A Case Study of the Reorganization of the Little Rock School District

In July 2005, the Little Rock, Arkansas, school district implemented a new policy to reorganize its management structure in order to create a more efficient bureaucracy. Using Richard Matland’s ambiguity‐conflict model of policy implementation, the authors examine the implementation of this school reorganization policy. Interviews and surveys were conducted with the superintendent and his executive assistants, school principals, teachers, and staff. In line with Matland’s model, the findings suggest that successful implementation is directly related to the policy characteristics of ambiguity and conflict. However, the authors point to the importance of recognizing particular characteristics for different groups of stakeholders within the policy implementation process. Discrepancies among groups of policy actors in the degree of policy ambiguity and policy conflict lead to strikingly different implementation strategies.     

A method for determining molybdenum in cadaveric material by using alkylphenylcyclohexylcarboxylic acid]

Alkylphenylcyclohexylcarboxylic acid was found to be an efficient extractant to extract molybdenum from the cadaveric material. Method suggested is simple enough for use and doesn't require considerable amounts of chemical reagents.     

Irrational behavior in exposure to cold. Paradoxical undressing in hypothermia

One December morning the naked bodies of two alcoholics were found on an open place in the center of the city of Essen. The phenomenon of paradoxical undressing due to vital hypothermia is described and the significant influence of alcohol on hypothermia and confusion in connection with hypothermia is pointed out. Compared to the results of other authors, external and internal signs of lethal hypothermia were analysed in a retrospective series of 30 cases (autopsy material in the region of Essen, investigation period from 1979-1989).     

Changing views of jury power

This article highlights the major events and empirical research in the continuing debate over the power and competence of the jury in civil and criminal trials. The concept ofjury nullification, the power of the jury to return a verdict based upon their moral conscience despite the evidence and the law, is used as a convenient filter to discuss the legal and behavioral assumptions about jury power and performance. The legal, historical, and even behavioral contexts reflect a bipolar theme in the level of trust Americans have exhibited towards the jury system. One pole reflects the notion that juries lack predictability and rationality in their verdicts and are moved by emotional concerns. Antipodally, juries have been thought to reflect an historical competence at applying common sense notions of equity and rationality to conflicted and ambiguous cases. This article traces the history of these two views of jury power and competence. A critical review of the empirical research that may inform the debate about the jury's competence in both criminal and civil arenas is provided.     

Democracy at Rest: Strategic Ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment

The Prohibition (Eighteenth, 1919) and repeal (Twenty-First,1933) amendments, which represent the only case of a later amendmentdirectly reversing an earlier one, were ratified by the twodifferent methods allowed by Article V of the United StatesConstitution: the former by state legislatures, the latter bystate conventions. This essay examines the legislatures-or-conventionsdichotomy as a microcosm of William Riker's treatment of liberalismand populism, with specific attention paid to the state conventionsthat ratified repeal. Using previously uncollected county datafrom the special elections to choose the 1933 convention delegates,this study demonstrates that invocation of the convention methodwas strategic, and intended not only to legitimate the Twenty-FirstAmendment but also to improve its chances of passage.